

Around 1940 (Showa 15), Japan-US relations were the Japanese invasion of French Indochina, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany and Italy, and the Wang Jingwei administration. One of the worsening factors was due to the approval and the US economic sanctions against Japan (such as the embargo on gasoline and scrap iron for aircraft).

I was on the way. Restoring relations with the United States is an urgent task for Japan, which depends on the United States for most of its important resources.

Also, for the United States, with the full-scale assistance to the United Kingdom, the Pacific Ocean area. It was necessary to avoid a conflict with Japan.

Under these circumstances, negotiations between Japan and the United States have begun in order to seek to improve relations between the two countries.

From private diplomacy to the start of US-Japan negotiations. Two priests visit Japan and Tadao Ikawa's success. Return to January 1941.

On the 23rd, the country's Walsh and Drout reported the progress to Secretary of State Hull, Walker, and Roosevelt, saying, "Japan's proposal.

I submitted a memorandum of understanding.

The contents are the abolition of the Triple Alliance, the ceasefire in China, the approval of the Far East Monroe Doctrine, and the restoration of economic relations with the United States.

However, this is not a formal Japanese proposal, but the two teachers merely summarized the opinions of the Japanese side.

Met.

Roosevelt's attitude at this time is not clear, but Hull is skeptical and Walker is enthusiastic. there were.

Walker, Walsh, and Dlaut's initiative supports moderates within the Japanese government by concluding a Japan-US agreement, and Japan

The book's policy was to shift from a bond with Germany to a partnership with the United States, but Hull (and the State Department) said Japan.

Then, the moderates decided that it was impossible to suppress the military, and there was a temperature difference.

In any case, Roosevelt and Hull act as governments, allowing them to make private contact with the Japanese side.

Decided to wait until the new Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura was appointed (Nomura was appointed on February 11). Behind that is the American

Global strategy against Adolf Hitler's threat, namely Atlantic first principle (priority is given to overthrowing Germany)

Roosevelt and Hull had no objection to keeping the door open for the Japan-US talks.

On the other hand, after returning to the United States, Walsh and Dlaut's Japan-US diplomatic coordination work was carried out via Ikawa, Prime Minister Konoe, and Director of the Military Affairs Bureau Muto.

It was reported to Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

This work attracted the attention of Konoe and Muto, and Ikawa went to the United States in February to settle the intentions of the United States. Soshi

It was also decided that Hideo Iwakuro, a military section chief of Muto's subordinate, would travel to the United States in March. Muto, Iwabe's speculation

Is to resolve the Sino-Japanese War using the United States, and Japan also has an incentive to trade "Peace in the Pacific" with the United States.

There was.

On the 27th, Ikawa reunited with Walsh and Drout and was introduced to Walker by both teachers.

Walker is US-Japan relations

However, he explained to Ikawa that the diplomacy of private sector volunteers was effective in a subtle situation, and acted as a liaison to Roosevelt and Hull.

He bought it and encouraged him, saying, "I want the three parties to proceed with discussions and decide how to normalize diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States."

However, in the first place, both teachers misunderstood Ikawa's political position (Ikawa is regarded as an unofficial representative of Prime Minister Konoe).

However, Ikawa was only asked by Konoe to report the intentions of the United States), and Walker also Japan and the United States misunderstood Ikawa as Japan's plenipotentiary representative who has been given official authority and reported it to Roosevelt.

There was a communication gap in the negotiations from the beginning. On the 28th, Ikawa will be Ambassador Nomura.

Visit and report progress.

Ikawa and Drouot set out to draft an agreement, and on March 13th, Walker to Hull Japan from the Triple Alliance.

Withdrawal, guarantee of peace in the Pacific Ocean, opening of China's doors, political stability of China, impossibility of military and political aggression,

A memorandum of understanding was submitted stating that work was underway on content such as preventing the spread of communism.

Walker reported that the Japanese government had agreed to the Ikawa-Drouot agreement, but the content was

Unlike the position of the Japanese government, it could be said that Ikawa was running alone.

Hideo Iwakuro's participation and understanding of Japan and the United States It was Hideo Iwakuro who gave the official character to the drafting of the agreement between Ikawa and Drouot. there were.

The Army responded to Ambassador Nomura's request that the dispatch of Iwabe would require human resources familiar with the Sino-Japanese War to coordinate diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.

Yes, but I wonder if the Army leaders gave a secret life to the rocky shore about the work of Walsh and Drouot.

It is unknown.

However, the U.S. government understood that it had some kind of secret life due to the visit of a powerful army person to the United States, and confronted the rocky shore.

I took a favorable response.

On March 20, Iwabe reunited with Ikawa and was briefed on the draft agreement, but disagreed with it and decided to make amendments. in particular

Regarding the issue of the Triple Alliance,

If the purpose of the United States is to withdraw from the Triple Alliance of Japan, there is no possibility of entering into negotiations.

To.

The activities of Walsh, Drouot, Iwabe, and Ikawa were reported by the State Department as "John Doe Associates" (unidentified people).

Will be called,

They were the bearers of the US-Japan negotiations.

Iwabe and Drouot revised the draft agreement from April 2nd to 5th (Ikawa acted as an interpreter), and the resulting draft was completed.

The proposal was delivered to Ambassador Nomura and Postmaster General Walker.

According to Iwabe's recollection, in the process of discussions with the US side, "If Japan withdraws from the Tripartite Pact,

There was a proposal to specify a sentence that "America will assist Japan in the event of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union" (although, Iwabe rejected it).

In addition, the following exchanges were held regarding the issue of Japanese troops stationed after the end of the Sino-Japanese War. The rocky shore is north of the United States

When I pointed out that I was stationed in China under the Kyo Protocol, I ran away saying that I was going to withdraw as soon as possible.

When Iwabe asked Panama troops in the United States, he excused that it was a concession and not Panama territory.

When asked if it would be okay to create a concession under the treaty after the change was resolved, he said that it would be a problem (after all, the Japanese army).

It was not possible to specify in the draft the stationing of troops).

There was no objection from the US side regarding the Manchurian approval issue.

The draft was revised by both Japan and the United States, and was tentatively completed on April 9.

Hull state affairs who received this

The Secretary consulted with the State Department's Far East for three days, saying, "Most of the proposals are hoped for by bloody Japanese imperialists.

It was just a mess," he said, disappointed with the content.

However, Hull said, "Although there are some points that I cannot accept at all, I can accept it as it is. There are some points that I can agree with with some amendments," and decided to use this as a clue to the negotiations.

After that, the draft was settled on April 16 as the "US-Japan Ryokai" after some minor revisions by both parties.

In terms of content, Iwabe's claim was included quite a bit, but it was just a tentative plan as a starting point, and "what kind of insistence"

There is no cohesiveness."

However, regarding Shikoku Kyosho, the German side was Matsuoka's because the negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union that took place the previous year had broken down.

Contrary to speculation, he strongly denied the possibility of Shikoku Kyosho (Hitler had already decided to attack the Soviet Union and Barbarossa.

He ordered the operation in secret.

The German side requested Japan's attack on Singapore, that is, participation in the war against Britain, and the defeat of Britain was time.

Japan's military action, which is a problem of Japan, was relentless to prevent the participation of the United States, but Matsuoka attacked Singapore.

It did not give the word of attack.

Meanwhile, negotiations with the Soviet Union came to fruition on April 13 when the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty was signed.

Matsuoka, who summarized the difficult negotiations, strengthened Japan's international position by approaching Japan and the Soviet Union, and headed for the upcoming negotiations with the United States.

It paved the way for diplomacy by "intimidating power" (Secretary of State Hull started negotiations between Japan and the United States in the background.

It has been pointed out that the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty had the power of this day.

After that, Matsuoka stopped the assistance of the Chiang Kai-shek administration to the United States under the pressure of Japan, Germany, Italy, and Shikoku, and the China incident was only during the Sino-Japanese War.

We will pursue a policy of resolving between them, but this is said to resolve the Chinese incident through the mediation of the United States.

It was incompatible with the "Japan-US Ryokai".

In addition, Matsuoka met with US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Steinhart as a stepping stone for Japan-US negotiations during his visit to Europe, and President Roosevelt

I was asking for a message to the territory. Two talks on the outbound and inbound trips and the contents of Matsuoka's "Strict Private Communication" letter

It is as follows.

-Japan will not attack the territories of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including Singapore.

- Japan has no intention of opening a war with the United States.

- The US–Japan war will bring about communism in the Far East.

If Chiang Kai–shek does not accept fair and legitimate peace, the president should say that he will discontinue US aid.
is there.

–Guarantee that the United States can trade with southern countries with rubber, tin, oil, etc.

- If there is an error in China that violates the interests of the United States, compensation will be made after the end of the Sino–Japanese War.

- Japan will keep the obligations of the Tripartite Pact.

- Japan has no obligation to war with the United States, but things may change if the United States declares war on Germany.

I.

It is speculated that Matsuoka may have tried to trade security guarantees in Southeast Asia with China's problems. But,

Roosevelt raises strong concerns about the Triple Alliance at the first formal meeting between Ambassador Nomura and Roosevelt on March 14.

Despite the indication, it was important that Matsuoka suggested that he would participate in the war against the United States.]

In any case, these contents were reported to Hull by Steinhart, but both Hull and Roosevelt. He did not show any interest.

Hull Four Principles 1 Respect for the territory and sovereignty of all countries 2 In principle, non–intervention in domestic affairs with other countries 3 Trade opportunities Observe the principle of equality, including equality.

4 Maintain the status quo of the Pacific Ocean unless changed by peaceful means.

The core of the four principles is the denial of military action, and the release of Japan's military policy from the Sino–Japanese War to the invasion of French Indochina in the north.

It included abandonment (however, it does not affect Manchuria and will be applied to future issues. Hull explains to Nomura.

In addition, 3. is the promotion of free trade (Hull was a free trade theorist), and Hull went to China in the Japan–US negotiations.

Japan demands the application of the above, and Japan infringes the vested interests of the United States in China with military force, and free economic activity

You will be accused of restricting movement.

Hull told Nomura, on the premise of accepting the four principles, "The Japanese government approved this (proposed solution) and gave it to us.

Proposals will provide the basis for the start of our negotiations. "

Nomura suggested that 3. should not be a prerequisite and may be discussed at future meetings, but Hull Hako

I didn't accept it.

However, Nomura sent the US–Japan Ryokan to the Japanese government without attaching these four principles (Nomura will not proceed at a later date).

Fearing that, "I held this down."

(May 8, Nomura Den), but as a result, it distorted the true intentions of the United States).

US–Japan Ryokai Proposal The summary of the Japan–US Ryokai Proposal consists of the following seven items.

1 Japan and the United States acknowledge that they are powerful countries in the Pacific region that are adjacent to each other, and through joint efforts, the Pacific Ocean

Establish peace and quickly achieve amicable understanding.

2 As an attitude toward the European War, Japan's purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent the spread of the European War.

Its military obligation is where Germany was aggressively attacked by countries not actually participating in the war.

Declare that it will be activated only if.

The United States' attitude toward the European War, on the other hand, is solely from the standpoint of defending its own welfare and security.

Make a statement to make a decision.

3 When the President of the United States accepts the following conditions for the Sino-Japanese War and the Government of Japan guarantees them, the President

Recommends peace to the Chiang Kai-shek administration.

A. China's independence. B. Japanese troops withdraw from China under an agreement between Japan and China. C. Chinese territory not annexed. D. Non-compensation. E. Medium

Revival of the national open door policy.

F. Chiang Kai-shek administration and Wang Jingwei administration merge.

G. Self-restraint of Japanese collective immigrants to China. H. Manchurian approval.

4 In order to maintain peace in the Pacific Ocean, Japan will not deploy sea and aerodynamics that threaten each other, and Japan will respond to the wishes of the United States.

Commissioned national vessels to the Pacific Ocean.

After the talks are concluded, the two countries will ceremonially dispatch a fleet to celebrate the arrival of peace in the Pacific Ocean.

5 Securing bilateral trade and reviving the Japan-US Trade and Navigation Treaty. Grant of gold credits from the United States.

6 Guarantee that Japan's development in the southwestern Pacific will not resort to force, but only by peaceful means

Based on this, the United States will cooperate in acquiring important resources such as oil, rubber, tin, and nickel from Japan.

7 Regarding the political stability of the Pacific Ocean, the two countries do not allow European countries to enter the Pacific region. B. Both

The country guarantees the independence of the Philippines.

C Japanese immigrants receive the same indiscriminate treatment as other people.

If the two countries agree on the above points, a Roosevelt-Konoe talk will be held in Hawaii.

Receiving as a "US proposal"

On April 18, a telegram of the US-Japan Ryokai proposal arrived in Japan. However, a serious misunderstanding arose here, and Prime Minister Konoe was convinced.

I received the proposal as a "US proposal".

In the "Konoe Note", that night, an urgent convening of the Great Headquarters Government Liaison Council was called "Consultation on the agenda of the US proposal.

It seems that Konoe clearly misunderstood the meaning of "negotiation tentative plan" in the draft solution.

Hideki Tojo, Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau Muto, and Director of the Navy's Military Affairs Bureau Takazumi Oka said, "The joy of the great Hashagi.

The move to send a telegram of "I agree with the principle" was suppressed, and "The reply was Foreign Minister Matsuoka's return to Japan."

It became after waiting for.

According to the "Konoe Note," "accepting this US proposal is the most important part of the Sino-Japanese incident process."

From the opinion, "generally leaned toward the argument that it should be accepted", but on the other hand, there was an opinion that emphasized the belief with Germany. It is said that.

Tojo and Muto became enthusiastic about the opportunity to resolve the Chinese incident, which turned the proposal into a swamp, and the Ministry of the Army was enthusiastic about it. It was decided that "I agree to start negotiations anyway."

In addition, the Army General Staff also said, "We will not rely on coordinating diplomatic relations with the United States to the extent that it does not go against the spirit of the Triple Alliance. There was a consensus on "the general direction to go", and finally an agreement was reached between the Army and Navy along this line.

However, on the issue of withdrawal from China, even the military bureau, which is willing to negotiate, is opposed to withdrawal.

What I thought was necessary from the perspective of protecting the economic activities of the Japanese was to cast a shadow on the future of negotiations. Became.

The substance of Japanese occupied territory management in China is "Retail, regardless of whether it is a large Japanese company or small and medium-sized capital. From the lives of merchants and employees of large and small national enterprises, Japan's economic system is closely linked to the occupation of the occupied territories. And all of that was possible only due to the harsh fact of being stationed in the Japanese army. " This made the issue of withdrawal difficult.

Opposition of Foreign Minister Matsuoka

Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who returned to Japan on April 22, said that the US-Japan Ryokai proposal was not a reply to Steinhart's work, but rather his own. I was in a bad mood when I learned that it was a story about a route I didn't know about.

At the liaison meeting that night, he said that he would like me to think about it for two weeks or a month or two, and made a proposal. I didn't try to fight.

According to the Konoe Note, Matsuoka is a patron of the United States after signing the Ishii-Lansing Agreement during World War I. This proposal is the bad faith of the United States, with the precedent of abandoning it after the war, excluding grief. He argued that it was understood as three minutes.

Regarding Matsuoka's perception of the United States, what Matsuoka was afraid of was the reproduction of World War I, and the United States participated in the war. If Germany and Italy are defeated, there is a possibility that the palm of the hand will be returned to the United States even if a compromise between Japan and the United States is reached. It is pointed out that it was.

After that, Matsuoka described the US-Japan Ryokai plan as "Army and Navy Plan Yori Sarani Hard" ("Confidential War Diary" (May 3)). It was significantly revised to and presented at the liaison conference on May 3.

In addition, Matsuoka proposed the following three principles at the liaison conference.

- Contribution to the Sino-Japanese War
- Do not conflict with the Triple Alliance
- Do not break international beliefs

The three principles are that the United States puts pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to contribute to the resolution of the Sino-Japanese War, and that the United States forms the Tripartite Pact. This is an American policy-Japanese troops from China, as it means approval, faith and cooperation with Germany. It was in direct conflict with the withdrawal of troops, the watering of the Triple Alliance, and British aid

in the European War.

Matsuoka's aim is to be even more bullish and prevent the United States from participating in the European War.

In that case, according to the Alliance Treaty, I think it is correct that Japan will naturally rise.

However, from the perspective of diplomacy, that is not the case. He said that he would not let the rice participate in the war, and that he would let the rice withdraw from China.

That's what I'm going to do next time. "(May 8th Liaison Roundtable).

On the same day, Matsuoka sent an oral statement (oral document) to Secretary of State Hull to Ambassador Nomura.

However, the content showed Matsuoka's bullish bargaining stance.

Germany and Italy do not make peace due to talks • The relationship between the Soviet Union and the Axis powers is good • The participation of the United States is a war
Prolonging the conflict • Japan is based on the Triple Alliance.

On May 7, Nomura met with Haru and read Matsuoka's oral statement, but there were many mistakes. (Nomura got the consent of Hull and took the hand of the oral statement. I'm sorry).

Hull can't stand Hitler's domination over the Seven Seas, to defend US interests
He told Nomura that he was determined to resist for 10 or 20 years.

In addition, Nomura proposed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty at the direction of Matsuoka, but Hull said, "It is included in the document on April 9.
It's a completely different matter from the proposal that was made. "

According to Nomura, Hull urged the start of US-Japan negotiations with all his might.

Interception and decoding of Japanese diplomatic power by the United States Regarding the exchange with Nomura, the contents of Matsuoka's telegram

He recalled that he knew about it, and he was careful not to let Nomura realize that.

In fact, the American side diplomacy was made in September 1940 with the purple cipher (the cipher used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

It succeeded in deciphering electricity, and in the Japan-US negotiations, it deciphered most of the diplomatic electricity on the Japanese side.

(However, it is a popular theory that Japan was completely defeated in the cryptocurrency war, and according to a study by Atsushi Moriyama, "Japan is the United States.

It is certain that the State Department's code was deciphered to the highest level. "

It's safe to assume that he had deciphered most of the major State Department telegrams. "

Hull's words: "We knew this because the Army and Navy crypto experts showed amazing prowess.

Intercepting the Japanese code, deciphering the Japanese government's diplomatic power sent from Tokyo to Washington and other capitals,

This is because it was translated into words and sent to the State Department.

This decryption information was named "Magic" and was very useful at the beginning of the negotiations. It didn't, but it played a big role in the final stages. "]

Matsuoka amendment plan

On May 12, Ambassador Nomura presented Hull with an amendment to the US-Japan Ryokai proposal by Foreign Minister Matsuoka. This fix

The proposal is an official proposal from Japan, and Hull states that "the basis of the US-Japan negotiations was laid on May 12th."

The main changes in the Matsuoka amendment are as follows.

Regarding the military obligations of the Triple Alliance, the phrase "only when aggressively attacked" in the draft solution was deleted. Ryo

According to the solution, the US participation in the war against Germany is self-defense (not an

aggressive attack), so Japan is not obliged to participate in the war.
The purpose of the cousin was implied.

However, in Matsuoka's plan, Japan's obligation to participate in the war is in line with the rules of the Triple Alliance, that is, the United States attacks Germany.
It became a form that emphasized the purpose of activating if you shoot.

Deleted all the provisions regarding the Sino-Japanese War that "recommend peace under the conditions accepted by both Japan and the United States."

In Matsuoka's proposal, the United States recommends peace in accordance with the Three Principles of Konoe and the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Declaration.
It was changed to the contents.

Deleted the phrase "without resorting to force" regarding Japan's expansion into the south. In Matsuoka's plan, armed force in case of emergency
I gave implications to the southward movement.

Removed the summit in Hawaii (although it will consider the summit if necessary).

In short, blocking the participation of the United States in the war, the China Incident was the Japan-China Basic Treaty (Army) that was signed with the Wang Jingwei administration.
The Japanese troops are stationed in North China and Inner Mongolia for joint defense, and for maintaining security, etc.
It was a proposal that focused on resolving the matter through direct negotiations between Japan and China based on the above.]

Hull's words: "There was little light of hope from this proposal.

Japan insisted only on its own benefit.

Rejecting this in one word is the first meeting between Japan and the United States months later.
It was to abandon the only opportunity to fundamentally discuss the proposal.

So we decided to proceed with negotiations based on this Japanese proposal, which would persuade Japan if
if there seems to be a slight possibility of withdrawing from the Triple Alliance, then only that purpose should be pursued.
Because I thought. "

June 21 US proposal

On June 21st (June 22nd, Japan time), the US side issued a formal response to the Matsuoka amendment (in the text).

However, "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment"
There was a note saying that it could not be called an official proposal of the US government).

From then on, the United States will stick to this proposal until Hull Note is presented.]

The United States' participation in the European War is for self-defense, and Japan does not apply the Tripartite Pact to the European War.

Regarding the Chinese issue, the economy is based on the basic conditions of peace (good neighbor friendship, no annexation, no compensation, and indiscriminate treatment).
Cooperation, prompt withdrawal under the Japan-China agreement, anti-comintern troops should be considered in the future, etc.)
As a suggestion, the president recommends the Chiang Kai-shek administration to negotiate with Japan.

Friendly negotiations on Manchuria.

The activities of both Japan and the United States in the Pacific region are based on the principles of peaceful means and indiscriminate treatment in international trade.
Cooperate to get the resources needed.

Based on the four principles of Hull, the content was to prohibit the advance of Japan by force to the south.

The new trade treaty guarantees mutual supply of necessary supplies, but limits for the security and self-defense of the country.

Regarding the Chinese issue, the suspension of assistance to Chiang Kai-shek requested by Japan, the confluence of the Nanjing government and the Chongqing government, etc.

In addition, in the attached oral statement, the Japanese government's statement of adherence to the Triple Alliance and North China

He accused the military stationing in Inner Mongolia, and as a whole it was a harsh content similar to Hull Note.

Ryoe Saito, an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the contents of the US proposal as the return of Manchuria to China, the denial of security and defense co-operation.

Denial of construction of "new order" by applying the principle of indiscriminate trade treatment, suggesting cancellation of Nanjing government, indirect expression

However, he interpreted it as a request to withdraw from the Triple Alliance and denied all of Japan's proposals.

The May 12th Amendment to Matsuoka and the June 21st US proposal denied the US-Japan Ryokai proposal from both Matsuoka and Hull.

Matsuoka also said, "I don't think we can continue working with the United States even if we say that we should do diplomacy."

On June 22, nine hours after Ambassador Nomura received this proposal, there was news of the opening of the German-Soviet war. The German-Soviet war

It means the collapse of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's Japan-Germany-Iso-Shikoku business concept (although diplomatic negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union before Matsuoka's visit to Europe

It broke down, and Shikoku Kyosho was an illusion), and for the United States, it turned from a compromise with Japan to a hard line.

It was an opportunity.

Regarding the relationship between the US proposal on June 21 and the opening of the German-Soviet war, the United States has obtained highly accurate information on the opening of the German-Soviet war. The situation in Japan is at a disadvantage

There is also a view that this proposal was made at the right time.

Hideo Iwakuro Words: "This is my subjectivity, but I think the change (American attitude toward Japan) was remarkable.

... In my opinion, if you put together the German-Soviet war, that is, before June 22 (negotiations based on the US-Japan Ryokai), you can put it together.

Hull's Oral Statement and Foreign Minister Matsuoka's Change June 21 US Secretary of State Hull's Orals

The Statement unfortunately points out that some Japanese leaders are German supporters, and they haven't named them.

However, there was a stigma that meant that negotiations would not be finalized as long as Foreign Minister Matsuoka was present.

Matsuoka, who received this as a request for cabinet reshuffle, was furious and Nomura, who relayed the oral statement.

He also criticized the ambassador.

As the Japanese government and the military were busy responding to the German-Soviet war, they began to consider the US plan on June 21 at a liaison conference.

It was only July 10th.

Matsuoka said that he had Advisor Saito attend and developed "almost all opposition to the US-Japan negotiations in response."

Matsuoka aims to cool the Tripartite Pact, kill the Nanjing government, and the Chongqing administration

is legitimate for Japan

Acknowledge that it is the Chinese government Peace recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek and Japan-neutralization peace negotiations set the basic conditions

It is concluded that the Japanese government will make a proposal to the US government and show off the premise that the US government will approve this.

On top of that, refusing to accept the oral statement, and if negotiations continue, Matsuoka's amendment in May

There is no choice but to stick to the plan and adopt a small US bill, but this is expected to conclude the US-Japan negotiations.

He said that there was no such thing, and that in the case of termination of negotiations, the timing and method should be carefully considered.

At the liaison conference on July 12, Matsuoka said, "I refuse the statement and negotiate with the United States.

I propose here that we cannot continue any further. "

Former Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama is not appropriate to give the United States a proboscis like a break, leaving room for negotiations

I asked Matsuoka, but Matsuoka will come out weakly because of his American personality, so he will come out strongly at this time.

I rejected it.]

However, the Army and Navy decided to postpone negotiations with the United States at least until the end of the French Indochina, and Japan was in the European War.

Take a unique position for expansion, obligations under the Tripartite Pact, and security and defense of your own country.

The basic conditions are based on the three principles of Kono, and the United States recommends a truce and peace negotiations.

However, intervention in peace conditions is not allowed, and Japan's use of southern force is not discouraged.

I asked for clarification.

However, these three points were deleted in the US proposal on June 21, and there is room for negotiation by reviving them.

It lacked the spirit of mutual concession.

Matsuoka said, "Is there any room, what (other) do you put in (concessions)?" "Do not use troops to the south."

If so (US), you'll ask, but is there anything else (concession)? "" If you continue to negotiate, kick (from US)

Only after being kicked and kicked will the negotiations be stopped. "

Rejects the oral statement, but the negotiations have decided to re-amend Matsuoka's amendment and continue.

The creation of a Japanese counter-proposal began after the liaison round-table conference, but Matsuoka sabotaged a reminder from the Army and Navy.

Therefore, the alternative plan was completed on July 14th.

Moreover, Matsuoka said, "First, I issued a train to reject the oral statement, and after a few days, Japan "We should generate electricity," he insisted, which could lead to bad feelings on the part of the United States and break negotiations.

At least the refusal training and Japan's counter-proposal confronted Prime Minister Kono and the Army and Navy, who said they should generate electricity at the same time.]

At midnight on July 14, Matsuoka adhered to his theory and sent only a request to withdraw the oral statement, but the next day.

On the morning of the 15th, Taro Terasaki, the director of the United States, who received the intention of the guard, chased the Japanese plan without permission from Matsuoka and hit it.

The situation was confusing, such as turning on electricity.

At this point, the relevant ministers agreed that Matsuoka could not handle serious diplomatic issues, and on the 16th, recently.

Mamoru resigned from the cabinet to dismiss Matsuoka.

On July 17, Hull simply withdrew his oral statement in response to Japan's request. But this day Hull's request because Matsuoka was not promoted to Foreign Minister with the establishment of the 3rd Konoe Cabinet and became Teijiro Toyoda of the Anglo-American faction. Passed as a result.

Konoe describes Toyota's inauguration as Foreign Minister as "a sign of my enthusiasm for somehow concluding the US-Japan negotiations."

Economic sanctions against Japan A plan to send troops to the southern part of French Indochina in line with the transition of the imperial national policy outline from around May It was being considered, but the cold attitude of French Indies to Japan, the impasse of economic negotiations with the Dutch East Indies, and the inevitable news of the opening of the German-Soviet war. (June 6, Oshima Den) and other factors have led to the rise of the Southern French Indochina theory in the Army and Navy.

The aim was to seize the French Indies and put pressure on the Dutch East Indies to obtain resources such as oil.

In addition, the Southern French Indies is a major military reason that it is an indispensable point for capturing the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya Singapore. It was.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka continued to oppose relentlessly, saying that if he went south, he would stimulate Britain and the United States, but on June 25, he opposed Matsuoka. The "Matters concerning promotion of southern measures", which stipulates the presence of Southern French Indochina in a restrained manner, have been decided.

Furthermore, on July 2, the "Situation" stipulated that the German-Soviet war would be "secretly prepared for armed forces against the Soviet Union and dealt with voluntarily." "Transitional Nibanfu Empire National Policy Outline" was decided at the Gozen Kaigi.

In addition, in the "Situation Transition Ni Banfu Empire National Policy Outline", "To achieve the purpose of the matter concerning the promotion of southern measures", the United States and Britain There is a statement that "I will not quit the war", but this will not be accepted for negotiations for the French Indochina unless there is a decision to fight against Britain and the United States. It was just an essay to convince Matsuoka that he couldn't do it.

The United States has grasped in advance the measures for Japan's invasion of French Indochina from magic information etc., and on the 23rd, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles has informed Ambassador Nomura that the US-Japan negotiations will be cancelled.

In addition, the United States announced in a newspaper on the 24th that Japan's advance to the south "has serious problems with Japan's security. I deeply recognize it as something to be missed." Regarding the Japanese troops stationed in China, there are security issues. Did not consider

The United States also received the Japanese troops' presence in Southern French Indochina as the first step toward the invasion of Southeast Asia. It was.

• Hull words • "They use the lies and fraudulent words of peace and friendship to qualify open and unfriendly acts. Use it.

This does so until they are ready to move forward.

Japan's aggression can only be stopped by force.

The problem is how long we can move things around until the end of the European military problem. "

US Economic Sanctions on Japan and Presidential Proposal for French Indochina Neutralization President

Roosevelt in the Philippines as a Countermeasure

We decided to strengthen our defense and freeze our assets against Japan. However, Secretary of State Hull and the U.S. Navy have imposed strong economic sanctions.

Opposed that it would lead to Japan's invasion of the Dutch East Indies and eventually a clash between Japan and the United States, and Roosevelt's asset freeze was entirely

He promised not to bring an embargo.

On the morning of July 24, Roosevelt mentioned the issue of oil supply to Japan as follows.

"If the United States had run out of oil, Japan would probably go to Orchid India a year ago and the United States would war with Japan.

Would have been.

The United States hopes to keep the war out of the South Pacific for its own benefit, for the defense of Britain, for freedom of the seas

With, oil was supplied to Japan. It has been useful for the past two years. "

At a cabinet meeting on the afternoon of the 24th, Roosevelt decided to freeze Japanese assets in the United States.

After seeing Ambassador Nomura, Roosevelt has persuaded public opinion to insist on an oil embargo on Japan.

But now that rationale is being lost, if Japan fights the Netherlands and Britain to get oil, the United States

Said that the situation would be serious because of the support policy.

On top of that, if the Japanese troops withdraw from the French Indochina, the Chinese, British, Dutch, and American governments will be neutral.

Proposed to neutralize the French Indochina as a guarantee (Roosevelt is a way for each country to obtain the supplies of the French Indochina freely and equitably.

He also states that he will do his best if there is one.

On July 26, the United States implemented a freeze on Japanese assets in the United States (the United Kingdom and the Dutch East Indies followed suit, and the Japan-Ranch Private Oil Agreement

It was stopped).

On July 27, US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew, who received a report from his home country on the presidential proposal, said, "This is what Japan calls itself.

To get out of the difficulties and the siege of the ABCD nation, which also threatens the security of its own country, which Japan calls itself.

We are providing Japan with a method that makes sense, "he said, and met with Foreign Minister Toyoda and requested that he accept the presidential proposal.

Gru worked hard to persuade Japan to accept the proposal, which would determine peace in the Pacific. Toyota responded negatively, saying that the proposal was so serious that it could not be answered immediately.

It should be noted that Gru is generally believed by the American people that Japan's current policy is under German pressure.

Pointing out that, Toyota strongly denied that Germany had nothing to do with Japan's policy making.

Total oil embargo

On August 1, the United States announced the specific details of trade restrictions with Japan, saying, "Japan is 35-36 within the limits of US defense.

Export licenses and freezing funds for low-quality gasoline, crude oil and lubricating oil up to the same amount purchased in the year

Issue a certificate. Other trade is totally disallowed, except for raw sardines and food. "

However, after that, the release of frozen funds for oil exports to Japan and payment of oil transactions was not actually permitted, and candy

Rika has decided to embargo a total embargo on oil (in the first place, the United States has not issued a total embargo)

Be careful).

The reason why the embargo was totally banned even though the oil export control system was built is the pressure of public opinion.

The theory that the management system did not work due to the inaction of bureaucrats of hardliners against Japan (loose)

Belt and Hull allegedly didn't know about the oil embargo until September), funded by Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

The theory that the freeze was not lifted, Roosevelt's firm will to deter Japan's "southward" and "northern"

There is a theory that points out the influence of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, and the debate continues.

The reason why the United States has imposed a total embargo is still a mystery.

The Japanese side does not assume a strong attitude of the United States, and Kenryo Sato, chief of the military affairs section, said that the Japanese army has already advanced to the northern French Indochina.

He said he was stationed and decided that it would not be a war between Japan and the United States just to go south.

In addition, the "Secret War Diary" on July 25 states, "We are confident that there will be no embargo as long as we stay in French Indochina," and the assets are frozen.

On the 26th, when the message was transmitted, it was stated that "we do not see the group as a total embargo, and we judge that rice should be embargoed."

In the margin of the diary on the 26th, he noted, "The judgment of Group 20 in this case was miscalculated.

At that time, Japan had only two years of oil stockpiling in normal times and one and a half years in wartime, and orchards in the oil-producing area before the oil ran out.

The option of capturing the mark will emerge.

And, considering the capture of the Dutch East Indies and the transportation route of resources, it is also impossible to capture the Philippines and Guam, which were US territories at that time.

It is absent, which inevitably means the start of war against the United States.

As a result, the invasion of French Indochina and the total embargo on Japan became a crossroads to the Pacific War.

Answer to the presidential proposal

On August 6, Japan's response to the French Indochina neutralization proposal was presented by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary of State Hull.

- (Government of Japan's commitment) Japan will not be stationed more than French Indochina, withdrawal from French Indochina after the resolution of the Sino-Japanese War, Philippines Guarantee neutrality and cooperate in acquiring US resources in Toa

- (US government commitment) The US stopped expanding its arms race in the southwestern Pacific Ocean, cooperated with Japan's acquisition of Dutch East Indies resources, and traded between Japan and the United States.

Resurrection of relations, bridging negotiations between Japan and China, and approval of special status in Japanese French Indochina after withdrawal

This is a concession for Japan, but if you stay in the southern French Indochina, it will be persuasive and the French Indochina will be neutralized.

On the contrary, it was a very good proposal, such as asking Japan for a privileged position.

Hull gave a pessimistic outlook on the proposal, expressing deep disappointment with Japan's actions, and then Japan conquered it.

Unless the policy was abandoned, there was no room for discussion.

The US response was given by Hull on the 8th, which means that Japan's proposal is not sufficient as an answer to the presidential proposal.

Was severely pointed out

Summit proposal from Japan

On August 4, Prime Minister Konoe announced the decision of the Japan-US summit meeting to Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army Tojo and Minister of the Sea Koshiro Oikawa. Oikawa fully agrees Tojo announced that he would not leave the cabinet even if the talks were not finalized, and that he would face with the determination of the war against the United States. I agreed with the conditions.

Konoe's intention was delegated full authority by Emperor Showa, to speak directly with President Roosevelt, and to pass directly through the military. It is said that the situation was resolved by seeking the approval of the emperor.

On August 7, Konoe was urged by Emperor Showa to promptly carry out the summit meeting, and addressed to Ambassador Nomura, "(Japan and the United States). The only way to overcome the dangerous situation (of diplomatic relations) is to meet directly with the US and Japanese managers and show their true intentions to each other. "I believe in considering the possibility of bureau bailout," he said, proposing a summit meeting with President Roosevelt. did.

The summit offer was made by Nomura to Secretary of State Hull (President Roosevelt is Winston Char). Hull's reply was ambiguous because he was absent because he was out for an Atlantic meeting with British Prime Minister Chill.

On August 17, Roosevelt, who returned from the Atlantic talks, read a warning to Japan to Nomura.

"If the Japanese government tries to control neighboring countries militarily by force or threat of force, it will be a policy or plan.

Therefore, if any measures are taken in the future, the U.S. Government will preserve the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and its people.

We will have to take immediate steps that we think are necessary to protect and ensure the security of the United States. "

Roosevelt, on the other hand, favors the summit proposal and cannot go to Honolulu, but in Juneau. Please reply.

On August 26, after the approval of the Great Headquarters Government Liaison Conference, Konoe said, "First of all, we had a direct press conference between the two leaders and it was not necessarily the conventional clerical work.

Discussing important issues across the Pacific Ocean that exist between Japan and the United States from high places without being bound by business discussions

It is an urgent need to consider the possibility of relief, and the details will be the responsibility after the summit meeting as necessary.

"It's okay to negotiate with the authorities," he issued a "Konoe message." Handed "Konoe Message" from Nomura on the 28th

Roosevelt praised this very much and said he would meet for about three days.

However, at the meeting between Nomura and Hull that night, Hull is really worried if the summit does not come to a conclusion.

I would like to make a final decision at the summit meeting after summarizing the general story in advance.

Showed the direction.

Japanese plan dated September 6

On September 3 (US time), the US side handed a memorandum of understanding, and in principle agreed with the summit meeting, but on the fundamental issue of the agreement.

He argued that a preliminary meeting should be held, and that discussions should be held under the Hull Four Principles and the June 21 US proposal.

At the same time, the Japanese side is considering a new proposal to the United States (Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposal "Matters concerning Japan-US negotiations"), September 3 This was adopted at the liaison conference (Japan time).

On the 4th, Foreign Minister Toyoda gave Ambassador Glu to Japan, and on the 6th (US time),

Ambassador Nomura gave Hull.

It was handed to the Secretary of State with a new proposal to the United States (it was dated and called the Japanese proposal dated September 6).

The main points of the Japanese agreement on the Japanese draft dated September 6 are as follows.

- Do not advance into the armed forces based on French Indochina, and do not appeal to military action against the north (Soviet Union) without a justifiable reason.

- Japan will voluntarily decide the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the European War.

- Japan will endeavor to restore the full normal relationship between Japan and China, and after that, it will be as soon as possible in accordance with the Japan-China Agreement.

Ready to withdraw

- U.S. economic activities in China will not be restricted as long as they are carried out on a fair basis.

- Japan's activities in the Southwest Atlantic follow the principle of peaceful and trade indiscriminate treatment, and the United States is required.

Cooperate in acquiring production of resources

-Take necessary measures to restore normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and mutually agree on this.

Immediately abolish the freeze order on the condition of

Toyota explained to Nomura, and this new proposal is "the result of our response to the" preliminary discussion "(insisted by the US side).

As a general rule, the Japanese side showed confidence that "as soon as they meet each other" and "the maximum that can meet the hopes of rice".

He said he intends to wait for a political solution at the meeting between the two leaders.

At the meeting on the 6th, Nomura told Hull, and the US side demonstrated a high degree of "statesmanship" to promptly realize the summit meeting.

At the meeting on the 10th, Hull said that Japan's new proposal was "very much" Naro "Udown," he complained. Hull is the content of the "Japan-Span Agreement" in withdrawal of troops and "fairness" in economic activities.

He has questioned restrictive language such as "basic" or "" southwestern "Pacific" and survived negotiations with ambiguous expressions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' intention was missed.

Frustration of the summit

On September 27, the Japanese side struck a call to hold a Japan-US summit at the expense of misleading relations with Germany, and transported it.

Ships and attendants have also been decided, and it was suggested that October 10th or October 15th would be convenient. However, on October 2nd

The answer given by Secretary of State Le does not break the principle theory, and the Japanese and U.S. governments have not reached the consent in advance.

As mentioned above, the summit meeting was practically rejected as dangerous.

In response, Nomura said that the Japanese government would be disappointed and took over, saying, "The US-Japan negotiations are finally deadlocked.

There is a view that it has become, but the road to breakthrough is not necessarily inexhaustible. "

Regarding the Japan-US summit meeting, Foreign Minister Toyoda said, "If you go, you will definitely be able to complete it.

"I was prepared to decide and ask for approval," recalled Oka, the director of the Ministry of the Navy, saying, "Konoe met Roosevelt.

If you do, you'll get rid of it on the spot, so if you go anyway, you'll be able to do something about it. "

On the U.S. side, Ambassador Gru, who was asked by Prime Minister Konoe and Toyota to make an effort to hold the summit, is in danger of Japan and the United States.

He had repeatedly reported to Hull and the State Department that it was an opportunity to avoid this.

However, Gru's suggestion was rarely dealt with, and it was Stanley Hornbeck, a political adviser to the State Department, who had an influence. It was a suggestion.

Hornbeck strongly opposed the summit, saying, "Even if the meeting is held, can Konoe do anything? You can only make a completely vague commitment."

Hornbeck's perception of Japan is exhausted by the four-year Sino-Japanese War, Japanese leaders fighting for friends. Because of the instability, he said, "There is no danger in Japan."

And if we continue diplomacy with the power to exert economic and military pressure on Japan, "it will be the best opportunity to save time. It has the best potential to prevent the spread of state of war in the territory of the Pacific Ocean, which is ultimately the Triple Alliance. He was developing his theory that "it can be expected to collapse" and "the possibility of war will decrease in the short and long term."

Hull was also opposed to the summit meeting as the second Munich meeting, and Lou was initially enthusiastic. It is said that President Zubert also adopted Haru's advice.

Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines (Imperial Policy Implementation Policy)

During this time, Japan's national policy was greatly inclined toward the start of the war against the United States. On August 16th, from the Navy side to the Army side, "Imperial National Policy Execution A new national policy called "policy" was presented.

The essence is, "We proceeded with preparations for the war without deciding on the war, diplomacy during this time, and in the midst of diplomatic breakthrough. The aim of the Navy was to prepare for the war.

However, here the differences between the Navy and Army war-opening processes surface. Navy war preparation is mainly about fleet formation. By switching to wartime organization, I was able to respond flexibly without "war determination". On the other hand, the Army prepares for war. Is to mobilize a large number of soldiers inland and transport them to the continent by sea, and is a full-scale war quasi without "war determination". It was the Army's logic that it could not be equipped. Thus the Army side (The General Staff Headquarters) presented an amendment (called the "Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines") that clearly stated "war determination", and the Navy side. It will be repeated negotiations with. The Navy strongly opposed the war determination, but in the end, "the determination not to quit the war." A compromise was reached with the wording, and the time of war determination was in early October ("Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines" established on August 30). The draft of the Army and Navy's proposal is "With the determination to quit the War of 1812, we will complete the war preparations by the end of October."

"Diplomatic negotiations lead to early October

However, if I cannot meet my demands, I will immediately decide to open a war against the United States. ")

The point is, "The Navy thinks that" only the preparations for the war are completed and the start of the war and the avoidance of war should be decided at the last moment. " The army, who is in the position of saying, "If you don't make a clear decision, you can't prepare for the war," wrote the composition on the desk. " However, it was decided to significantly limit Japan's national policy later.

Determination of imperial policy implementation guidelines

On September 3, the Army and Navy's proposal for the "Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines" was submitted to the Great Headquarters Government Liaison Council. However, Minister Oikawa

As he disagreed with the draft, he eventually said, "By diplomatic negotiations, even until early October, I still have the prospect of being able to fulfill my demands.

An expression that leaves room for negotiations to continue with the addition of the amendment that "if there is no case, we will immediately decide to open the war against the United States."

(In the "Confidential War Diary", "It should be seen as a watering down of this plan. It will be a bigger discussion in early October."

It is written as "Rubeshi").

In the process of deliberation, Osami Nagano, General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, said that Japan is running out of supplies, and on the contrary, the enemy side is getting stronger.

Sugiyama said that there is a chance of victory now, but it may disappear over time.

Since it will take time to mobilize, the war preparation is scheduled for late October, and I wanted to make a decision as soon as possible.

Regarding the reason for preparing for this war in late October, according to the "September 6th Gozen Kaigi Q & A Material",

As for the outlook for the war, the "Question and Answer Material" states as follows.

- The oil stockpiling is at most two years, and the ability to carry out war declines over time.

-The US Navy and Air Force will improve dramatically over time, especially after the fall of next year, the US Navy's armament will surpass the Japanese Navy.

To be

- The northern operation (against the Soviet Union) is extremely difficult in winter, and the southern operation was completed promptly during this period, starting next spring.

There are three points that need to be prepared for the Northern Operation of the Fall.

In addition, in the "Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines", as a separate sheet, "Minimum requirements that the empire should achieve in negotiations with the United States (UK)" "Request" was attached.

- The United States and the United Kingdom do not interfere with or interfere with Japan's Chinese incident processing.

Closed Burma Street, which does not interfere with attempts to resolve the incident under the Japan-China Basic Relations Treaty and the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration

Chained and does not provide military, political or financial assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek administration • The United States and Britain carry out military reinforcement in the Far East I don't know

- The United States and the United Kingdom will cooperate in acquiring necessary supplies for Japan.

If these requests are accepted, Japan will make the following promises.

- Do not use French Indochina as a base to advance into nearby areas other than China

- After establishing a fair peace in the Far East, withdraw from the French Indochina

- Guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines

- (Attachment) The attitude toward the European War is based on the idea of protection and self-defense, and the three-country article in the case of the United States participating in the European War.

Japanese Interpretation and Lines for About

The movement is done independently. However, Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact will not change.

These diplomatic conditions are clearly over-demanding for Japan, which is in dire straits due to economic sanctions, and to the United States.

It was unacceptable.

However, it was the best slogan for Japan as well, surrounded by Western imperialism.

The liaison meeting passed the draft in just one 7-hour deliberation, and at the Gozen Kaigi meeting on September 6, the "Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines" were announced. It was officially decided. In addition, at the Gozen Kaigi, there was one act in which Emperor Showa made an unusual remark, and the product of Emperor Meiji was made. He read aloud and stabbed the commander with a nail saying that diplomacy was the main and war was subordinate (however, the emperor did not interfere with the draft itself. I'm avoiding it).

Japanese draft dated September 25

After that, Japan's proposals so far were complicated, and even two weeks after the Gozen Kaigi, the prospects for US-Japan negotiations are uncertain. Since he could not stand, he decided to decide the final attitude of the Japanese side and present it to the US side.

The draft was decided at a liaison meeting on September 20 and handed to Ambassador Gru on the 25th (handed on the 27th in Washington).

1 (omitted)

2 (Attitudes of the two governments toward the European War) Efforts to promptly restore world peace by cooperating at an appropriate time. Until then Then the governments of both countries act from the standpoint of protection and self-defense. Interpretation of Japan's Triple Alliance in the case of participation in the United States, Obligations are fulfilled exclusively voluntarily.

3 (Measures to resolve peace between Japan and China) The United States bridges the Chongqing administration to negotiate with Japan, and during that time Japan Do not take any action that interferes with the measures and efforts related to the resolution of the Chinese incident.

Japan has a statement on the basic conditions for resolving the Sino-Japanese War and a treaty with the Wang Jingwei administration that has already been implemented (Consistent with the Japan-China Basic Relations), and economic cooperation between Japan and China should be carried out by peaceful means in international trade relations. It is carried out on the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of natural special close relations between neighboring countries, and is fair in third countries. It is clear that economic activity is not excluded.

4 (Trade between Japan and the United States) Restore normal trade relations. Immediately abolish mutual asset freeze.

(Economic issues related to the Southwest Pacific) Creation of conditions for international trade and investment under the principle of peaceful and indiscriminate treatment Strive for. Regarding the acquisition of special supplies such as oil, agreements with related countries and theirs based on indiscriminate treatment Cooperate in implementation.

5 (Political stability policy in the Pacific region) Japan is based in French Indochina and is located in a neighboring area (excluding China) Do not advance by force. Withdraw from French Indochina after establishing fair peace in the Pacific region. The United States is the Southwest Pacific region Mitigate military measures. The two countries respect the sovereignty and territory of Thailand and the Dutch East Indies, and agree to neutralize the Philippines after independence. Is concluded. The United States guarantees indiscriminate treatment of Japanese in the Philippines.

"Note" Basic conditions for day neutralization

(1) Good neighbor friendship, (2) Respect for sovereignty and territory, (3) Japan-China joint defense: For the purpose of anti-comintern and security maintenance Japanese Army and Navy stationed in a fixed area for the required period, (4) Withdrawal: Other troops are associated with the resolution of the Chinese incident Withdrawal of troops, (5) Economic tie-up, a. Japan-China economic alliance for the development and

utilization of national defense resources

, B. Fair third-country economic activity is not restricted, (6) Chiang Kai-shek administration and Wang Jingwei administration merge, (7) non-merger,

(8) No compensation, (9) Manchurian approval

Since this proposal reflects the forced opinion of the General Staff Headquarters, it seems that it can be called a concession.

It doesn't mean that Japan will participate in the war automatically).

It is premised that the US side should walk. "

Ambassador Nomura complained that "the proposal for renewal is in trouble now", listing the difficulties, especially based on the treaty with the Wang Jingwei administration.

He advised that the negotiations would be broken due to the issue of troop dispatch, which would not satisfy the United States on September 28 (September 28).

Muraden. Before and after this telegram, there were reports from military attachés in the United States, but all of them were "related to the military attaché problem.

The content was that "negotiations are unlikely" and "unless the Garrison in China is abandoned, it is clear that there is no hope of concluding negotiations").

On October 2, Hull said, "For peacekeeping in the Pacific, we want a clear agreement that cannot be understood with a temporary repair."

He handed a draft answer to Nomura.

It brings out the four principles of Hull, and then Japan goes to a specific area over an uncertain period under the "Japanese neutralization flat basic conditions".

Disagrees with the allegation of troops stationed in Japan and calls for further clarification of Japan's position on the Tripartite Pact

It was a thing.

Movement to avoid war October 2 Arrival of US proposal

In response to the US response draft dated October 2, the Army said at a ministry directors' meeting held on October 5, "There is no prospect of diplomacy.

It is necessary to promptly request a meeting before the decision to open the war. "However, the Ministry of the Navy's summit meeting was held on the same day.

"With the prime minister's firm determination, the Prime Minister's meeting with the Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army on the 6th, the delay of the period as there is room for negotiations, and the relaxation of conditions

We will have a rigging. "

The following day, on the 6th, at a meeting of directors of the Army and Navy, the Navy's director of military affairs, Oka, insisted that negotiations would be possible if the conditions for stationing troops were relaxed.

However, the conflict between the Army and Navy became apparent.

After that, Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army Tojo and Chief of Staff Sugiyama had no prospect of negotiations, did not approve the four principles of Hull, and regarding the conditions for stationing troops.

Does not change anything, including the way it is expressed, if the government has diplomatic potential, do this for up to 15 days

He decided to accept the policy and agreed to persuade the Navy and Prime Minister Konoe.

On the other hand, the Ministry of the Navy's summit meeting said, "Because of the issue of withdrawal of troops, the war between Japan and the United States is the essence of foolishness.

Reached the theory of continuation of negotiations.

However, Minister Oikawa expressed his determination and asked for his consent, saying, "Is it okay to fight with the Army?"

However, the Navy's intentions could not be unified because the President of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff disputed and the other attendees were silent.

Konoe met with Tojo on October 5th and 7th, and as a general rule, withdrawal of troops, and the actual operation of troops cannot be taken. I persuaded him, but Tojo refused to do it and ended up farewell.

At the meeting between Tojo and Oikawa on the 7th, there was no consensus over the prospects for negotiations, but Tojo questioned the confidence of the war. However, Oikawa declared, "There is no such thing." "The confidence of the commander is the victory of the beginning of the war. A few years later. Is under consideration." Tojo said, "If the Navy is not confident, we have to reconsider."

Of course, what should be changed with serious responsibility must be changed. "Mentioned the subject."

Furthermore, at the Tojo-Oikawa meeting on the following day, Tojo said, "At the end, with a sad look," he said as follows.

"I lost tens of thousands of spirits in the Chinese incident, and I can't stand to leave this, but if it's the Sino-Japanese War, it's tens of thousands more. If you think about losing the number of people, you have to think about withdrawing troops, but it is a place to decide and squeeze. Tekigaiso talks October 12, Konoe The minister invited the three land ministers and Teiichi Suzuki, the president of the Planning Institute, to Tekigaiso and held a final meeting on the Japanese war.

The main remarks are as follows.

Foreign Minister Toyoda "There is room for the US-Japan negotiations to be concluded. I think that it is expected that the issue of troop dispatch will be a little confused." If you are allowed to talk

The meeting decision was careless. "

Minister Oikawa "At the crossroads of diplomacy or by means of war.

The deadline is imminent. That decision should be made by the Prime Minister. "

Prime Minister Konoe "If I was told to do it either now, I would have to say that I would do it in diplomacy. I am not confident in the war. I am confident. I have to get someone to do it. "

Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army Tojo "Actually, the Army is moving the army by the decision of the Gozen Kaigi, and the current diplomacy is not ordinary diplomacy. No. If you try it, you will have trouble with diplomacy. "" It is certain that it will be resolved within the deadline requested by the commander along the line of Japanese conditions. If you can trust it, you may stop preparing for the war and start diplomacy. "" Even if the Prime Minister decides, he is blind as the Minister of the Army. I can't obey. I must be convinced that I am convinced. "Also, especially regarding the issue of troop dispatch, Tojo said, "The issue of troop dispatch. The Army cannot give up even one step. "" It is necessary to ask the troops to end the Sino-Japanese War. "

"The time required (for troops) is a permanent idea," he said. After all, I couldn't reach any conclusions at the Tekigaiso talks.

Because of this, Suzuki told Konoe, "I asked His Majesty to return the decision on September 6 to a blank sheet and continue negotiations with the United States. Why don't you decide to do it? "

Prime Minister Oikawa's discretionary theory and Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army's opposition to withdrawal

At this time, in order for Japan to avoid the catastrophe of the Japan-US war, the Navy leaders should clarify the attitude of avoidance, or the Army leaders should. Brave the withdrawal of troops from China

It was either, but neither became a reality.

Regarding the former, the day before the Tekigaiso talks, the war was fought from the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau Muto to the Navy via the Secretary-General of the Cabinet, Kenji Tomita. There was a request to state that there was no conflict, and to curb the main war theory within the Army.

In addition, Tomita also went along with the Navy's Director of Military Affairs, Oka, to make a statement to Navy Minister Oikawa that he would avoid the war and continue negotiations. Oikawa was in a position of military affairs, but he said he could or couldn't say that he couldn't do it. He continued to take the attitude of.

Regarding the latter, the following remarks by Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army Tojo can be noted. Before the Cabinet meeting on October 14, Tojo met with Prime Minister Konoe and He was asked to reconsider the issue of troop dispatch, but refused to do so, and the Cabinet said he "emphasized with excitement."

"The issue of withdrawal is the heart If we disobey the US claim, it will destroy the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War. It also jeopardizes Manchuria. To. Furthermore, Korean rule is in jeopardy.

The empire is not annexed and has no compensation in view of the purpose of the holy war. ... It is natural that the outcome of the incident will be achieved by stationing troops. There is no need to hesitate to the world. "" What if you refrain from taking an immovable position in North China Mengjiang? How will Manchuria construction be?

In the future, it will be a long-standing illness to the offspring, and in order to recover it, it will be a war again. Manchurian Incident
If you want to give back to the former small Japan, I wouldn't say anything again.

You shouldn't say that the withdrawal is a signboard. Withdrawal is a retreat. The empire needs to clarify the presence of troops.

It is natural to station the required troops and withdraw other unnecessary ones when the time comes. If the withdrawal is a signboard, the army will I'm faint. "" The troops are in the heart. What you should insist on is what you should insist on. Do I need to give up to the heart of the book?

So far, what is diplomacy, surrender. I don't know how far I'll go because I'll make him more and more on the chart.

Even if I am told that I am confident only by giving up, I cannot accept it. "

Tojo's remark was made to the effect that it is necessary to inform the general ministers of this issue, but none of the ministers refute it. It was said that it was good.

Tojo Cabinet and National Policy Review Resignation of Konoe Cabinet and Establishment of Tojo Cabinet

On the night of October 14, Prime Minister Konoe decided to resign as a result of a statement by Minister of the Imperial Japanese Army Tojo at a cabinet meeting. Konoe is the president of Suzuki Planning Institute

When asked about Tojo's thoughts on the political situation after his resignation, Tojo succeeded Prince Naruhiko Higashikyu as the successor to the cabinet. Recommended to the Prime Minister.

According to "Konoe's Note," Tojo's opinion is, "It seems that the Navy does not want war, according to what I will explore afterwards.

If the Navy doesn't know what to do, the September 6 Gozen Kaigi will be fundamentally overturned. "" Attendance at the Gozen Kaigi

The prime minister, the minister of land and sea, and the president of the commander's department did not fully fulfill the responsibilities of the condolences.

In this case, I think that there is no other choice but to resign from the office, break down what has been

done so far, and re-think the plan.

There is no one in his vassals who has the power to suppress the Army and Navy and rethink this plan. So I don't think there is any other way than having the successor cabinet head team come out to Miya-sama this time. "

Since Higashikunimiya was an opponent of the war against the United States, Konoe also agreed with Tojo's opinion.

The following day, from the 15th to the 16th, negotiations were held between Konoe, Tojo, Suzuki, and Koichi Kido about the prime minister of the successor cabinet.

However, it is absolutely impossible for Kido to ask the imperial family for a breakthrough while the difficult problems remain unsolved, and the war in the imperial cabinet

He opposed the Prince Naruhiko Higashikyu because the imperial family could become a national grudge if it entered into a dispute.

Konoe, who was informed of Kido's opposition, summarized his resignation from the ministers, and the third Konoe Cabinet resigned altogether.

On October 17, a senior ministers' meeting was held, and Kido insisted that Tojo be recommended as the prime minister (and land minister) of the successor cabinet.
It was.

It is said that Kido nominated Tojo because his loyalty to the emperor was stronger than anyone else.

Tojo is prepared to be scolded by Emperor Showa for the Army's main war theory and the attitude of adhering to the troops.

However, contrary to expectations, he received a great order from the Cabinet.

In addition, Tojo was ordered by Emperor Showa to further cooperate with the Army and Navy, and then Navy Minister Oikawa, who came to Japan, was also the Army and Navy.

Was ordered to cooperate.

In addition, Tojo and Oikawa were informed by Kido of the sacredness of returning a blank sheet of paper to the decision of the Gozen Kaigi on September 6.

The Tojo Cabinet is notorious as a cabinet that has embarked on a war with the United States, but rather actively negotiates with the United States rather than the Konoe Cabinet.

You can also see it.

Tojo is leaning toward non-war theory, and the Foreign Minister has Shigenori Togo, who is known for his pacifism.

In addition, Tojo said in the cabinet negotiations with Finance Minister Okinori Kaya, "Try as much as possible in Japan-US negotiations and do not go to war.

I would like to make an effort to solve the problem peacefully. "With Shigetaro Shimada, who was a candidate to succeed Minister Oikawa.

In the negotiations for entering the cabinet, he promised to "enhance the naval armament" and "promote diplomacy."

Regarding the change of direction to promote negotiations with Tojo, even some voices from the Army said that it was a "Tojo change", but Tojo

The words of the emperor were absolute.

The collapse of the Konoe Cabinet and the emergence of the Military Cabinet gave the American side some confusion, but gave a bad impression.

It wasn't.

It was generally recognized that the dialogue between Japan and the United States would continue, although there was a danger of going into war.

Reexamination of national policy

The Tojo Cabinet, which was established on the 18th, decided to reexamine the national policy based on

the "return of blank paper". However, related materials for reexamination
The person in charge of the Army and Navy, who created many of them, is the same as the former
Cabinet except for the Minister of the Sea, and is reluctant to reconsider.
"It is rather natural that the original Kiam settled down because it was necessary to reexamine the
national policy based on the materials of such nature."
Theoretically, both Japanese war plans will be adopted.

Decision of Proposal A The liaison meeting on the 29th was a hearing on the conditions for the United
States.

The minimum demands of the September 6 Gozen Kaigi decision are that everyone is unlikely to conclude
diplomacy in a short period of time.
As a result of the agreement, discussions moved to relax the terms of the negotiations.

After all, there was a heated debate over the issue of troop stationing and withdrawal in China. Foreign
Minister Togo said, "The principle of indefinitely stationing troops on the territory of another country.
While preaching "nothing" and insisting on a five-year troop stationing period, the General Staff
Headquarters said, "When the troop stationing is due, the results of the Sino-Japanese War
There was a series of opposition, saying that he would lose it, and that Prime Minister Tojo implicitly
supported it.

Tojo proposed to put the number of years as a near-permanent expression, and although there were 99
and 50 year proposals, in the end it was 25 years.
By doing so, the story was settled.

In addition, the Tripartite Pact will not be changed as before, and the issue of indiscriminate trade
treatment in China will be "indiscriminate."
It was decided to accept this with the condition that "in the principle being applied to the whole world".

Plan A

1 Regarding the issue of trade indiscriminate, Japan applies the principle of indiscriminate to the whole
world, that is, the entire Pacific Ocean.
Approve that this principle will be implemented in China as well

2 Regarding the Triple Alliance issue, Japan clarifies that it has no intention of unnecessarily expanding
the interpretation of the right to self-defense. Alliance Article
Interpretation and performance of the agreement will act according to Japan's own decision

3 Regarding the issue of withdrawal of troops, (A) In China, a certain area of North China and Inner
Mongolia, and Hainan Island after the Heisei era
Required period The troops will be stationed and other troops will be withdrawn within two years under
the Japan-China agreement. There was a question from the US side about the required period
In that case, respond with the intention that it will be about 25 years.

(B) Japan respects the sovereignty of French Indochina. From French Indochina, after Japan
Neutralization Heisei or the establishment of fair peace in the Pacific region
Withdrawal of troops Regarding the Hull Four Principles, avoid including them in the formal agreement
between Japan and the United States as much as possible.

Plan A is a relaxation of the decision of the Gozen Kaigi on September 6, specifically, from the Japanese
plan dated September 25, three issues of concern (in China).
Three difficulties in negotiations between Japan and the United States
It is said to be a point), which relaxes Japan's claim.

Navy war determination

At the beginning of the cabinet, Minister Shimada stated that it was necessary to avoid the war, but the
discussion at the liaison conference from October 23 to 30
I was influenced by the controversy and overturned my opinion.

On the 30th, Shimada told Deputy Secretary Yorio Sawamoto and Director of the Military Affairs Bureau
Oka, "It's easy to think of this many people from the air of several days.
He expressed his determination to war, saying, "I can't bend the big waves now." Sawamoto said, "How

many times do you think?

Even if you look at it, it is possible to avoid the war on the big picture. "

Shimada urged him to think about it, but Shimada made a color and said, "No matter how much the Under Secretary's guarantee is, it is of no use.

It is important not to lose time. " Regarding this attitude of Shimada, "Political inexperienced Shimada From his history and personality, it was originally an impossible task for him to make a big decision on whether to start or avoid the war in a short period of time.

It is pointed out.

In this way, "substantially the last stop to the war was removed", and the Navy's determination to war was "poi of the war against the United States."

"To of no return".

November 1st Liaison Meeting The November 1st Liaison Meeting was held from 9am.

At the beginning, Sea Minister Shimada stubbornly insisted on increasing the dividend of iron and other supplies, and expressed his intention to open the war as soon as the request was approved.

The following discussions are: 1. Avoid the war and be angry, 2. Immediately decide to start the war, 3. Prepare for the operation and diplomacy under the determination of the war

We have begun to consider three plans to make them parallel.

The first plan was buried because it was judged impossible. Wo-ki-boku caused a definite decline in Japan's national power, and two years later

The worst case is assumed that if the US fleet attacks when the oil is exhausted, there is no choice but to give in without fighting.

It was because of it.

Finance Minister Kaya and Foreign Minister Togo are unlikely to attack from the United States and insist that there is no need for a war now, but for two years

Is it possible to break the argument that it is more advantageous to carry out southern operations and secure strategic points and resources than to spend time in vain?

It was.

Regarding the outlook for the war, the Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, Nagano, has only now the tactics, there is a certainty for two years after the start of the war, and it is not possible for the third and subsequent years.

Repeating the claim with Ming, Kaya and Togo sought to clarify the outlook for the third year and beyond, but in the end, "the third year of the war"

It is unknown after that. "

The second plan was adopted by the General Staff Headquarters, and Chief of Staff Sugiyama and Deputy Chief of Staff Osamu Tsukada said, "The operation will start in early December."

"I mean," "Diplomatic negotiations should be kept in mind to grasp the name of the start of the operation and to keep the intention secret," he developed the main war theory.

Foreign Minister Togo and Finance Minister Kaya argued against this and insisted on the final diplomacy, and Tojo was the third, including the date of diplomacy.

It was proposed that the proposal be deliberated in parallel.

The government's diplomatic demands and the commander's operational demands were in conflict, but in the end, even if diplomacy continued until November 30, the commander

I came to the conclusion that there was no problem, and Tojo said, "Isn't it December 1st? It's okay to have a day, so letting me do diplomacy for a long time

Can't you?" Tsukada "I can't do it. I can't do it after November 30th. "Shimada" Mr. Tsukada.

However, after the question and answer "It will be good until 12 pm" Tsukada "It is okay until 12 pm", the deadline for diplomatic termination is "December 1st."

It was decided to be "midnight" (because there was a risk that the third plan, the Japanese warfare plan, would be the second move of the decision of the Gozen Kaigi on September 6th.

The Chiefs of the General Staff have clearly agreed to cut the time, and in that sense, "It was the mound that cut the time at this point.

It was a partial victory of the main battle theory of the rice field ").

That is, if the US–Japan negotiations are not concluded by the end of November, it was decided that the war would start at the beginning of December (actually December 8).

Japan is afraid of the worst case and eliminates *Wo-ki-boku*, while the United States may come on board. Dating and uncertain wars after the third year were adopted because of wishful thinking.

At that time, it was common knowledge that the national power was separated between Britain, the United States and Japan, and all Japanese leaders knew that long-term wars would be extremely difficult. I was aware.

Nevertheless, in the case of negotiation failure, it is extremely that the war will be started instead of avoiding the war and being “worried.”

Prospect theory of behavioral economics and group decision-making in social psychology regarding the high-risk choices made

There are also studies pointing out the risky shift in.

Decision of B plan

The meeting moved to discussions on diplomatic negotiations, and Foreign Minister Togo suddenly showed the proposal B in addition to the proposal that had agreed on the 29th. The sleeping ears shocked the military of water.

Plan B (Ministry of Foreign Affairs draft)

1 Japan and the United States will not advance into Southeast Asia and South Pacific regions other than French Indochina

2 Japan and the United States cooperate with each other to obtain the necessary resources in the Dutch East Indies

3 The United States promises to supply 1 million tons of aviation gasoline to Japan annually

(Remark 1) If this agreement is passed, Japan is ready to move the troops stationed in Southern French Indochina to Northern French Indochina.

(Remark 2) If necessary, add the provisions on trade indiscriminate treatment and the Tripartite Pact in the conventional proposal (Proposal A).

Enter

The aim of the second plan is to restore US–Japan relations to the state before the asset freeze, and abandon the armed southward due to the withdrawal of troops from the southern French Indochina. And to show Japan’s sincerity of peaceful intentions.

Togo said, “Because the conventional method of negotiation is not good, I first narrowed down the conditions and cleared up only the southern part. Chinese people want to do it by themselves in Japan. ” I don’t think the plan is hopeful in a short time, ”he explained.

However, Chief of Staff Sugiyama and Deputy Chief of Staff Tsukada strongly opposed the proposal, and the proposal was a French Indochina soldier without touching the Chinese issue.

From a national defense point of view, the country will be abandoned.

No, especially oil does not come in, arguing that the French Indochina garrison is important for policy toward the United States and for resolving the Sino–Japanese War,

In particular, Tsukada repeatedly said that it was “absolutely impossible” to withdraw troops from Southern French Indochina.

For this reason, the third paragraph of the draft was changed to “Return to the trade state before the freezing of funds and add oil imports”, and “Resolve the Sino–Japanese War”.

“Does not interfere” (an item calling for the suspension of US support policy) was added as a fourth item.

Even after that, Sugiyama and Tsukada, who still insist against the withdrawal of the Southern French Indochina, insist that diplomacy is not possible under such conditions.

The meeting with Togo was so big that the meeting was about to break down several times (in the Navy, the President of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff agreed with the proposal.

Has stated). The process of discussion in "Sugiyama Memo" is as follows.

"As shown on the right, the deputy president made a loud voice about moving from southern France (mark) to northern France (mark) and making it impossible to make a proposal.

After arguing with Togo, Togo agrees with him, sometimes threatening with non-war, sticking to his theory, and when proceeding with this debate.

There is a risk that Togo will retreat and the cabinet will collapse immediately, so Mr. Muto will propose a break and take a rest for a sufficient time."

Tsukada discusses in a separate room, and if he refuses the proposal, Togo may resign and develop into a collapsed cabinet, and a request for suspension of support

It was concluded that the United States would not swallow the proposal if there was any, and Sugiyama and Tsukada were forced to agree with the proposal.

According to Togo, Muto said, "If the Foreign Minister's claim is rejected and negotiations fail, the Army will be responsible for it.

Can you get it? "He said he talked to Sugiyama.

Here is the 16-hour "Historical Critical Liaison Conference" from 9 am on November 1st to 1 am on the following day 2 ("Confidential War Day"

Magazine "dated November 2), and at noon on the 2nd, under the determination of the Anglo-Dutch War against the United States,

"To negotiate with the United States according to Plan A and Plan B"

The "Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines" centered on "stopping the use of force if negotiations are concluded by midnight on December 1st"

It was adopted.

At 5 pm, Tojo, Sugiyama, and Nagano lined up to present the results of the liaison meeting to Emperor Showa.

It is said that Tojo performed with tears, probably because he could not meet the expectations of the emperor.

November 5th Gozen Kaigi

On November 5, the "Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines" were officially decided at the Gozen Kaigi. In the first place, "The success or failure of the US-Japan negotiations is straightforward.

It was not something that was directly linked to Japan's Japanese war, "but due to the national policy decisions on September 6 and November 5, Japan and the United States

The result was that the success or failure of the negotiations was directly linked to the Japanese war.

As a result, "Japan has taken a decisive step toward the start of the war."

In addition, Emperor Showa was dissatisfied with the "Imperial Policy Implementation Guidelines" at the Gozen Kaigi meeting on September 6, and exercised his influence, but this time.

Did not speak as usual.

It has been pointed out that the emperor had tremendous trust in Tojo about this change of mind.

In addition, the persuasive work of the commander's department, which showed the results of the operation against Britain and the United States in the material, was successful, and the anxiety about the war of the emperor was removed.

It has been pointed out that (Konoe) felt that the emperor was "gradually approaching the war" during his time as prime minister.

Last diplomatic negotiations Dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu

At 2:00 am on November 4, Foreign Minister Togo invited Saburo Kurusu and requested that he rush to Washington to support Ambassador Nomura.
did.

Togo explained the critical situation of US-Japan relations, Plan A and Plan B, and especially regarding the withdrawal of troops from the Southern French Indochina in Plan B.

As the last trump card for Wataru, I entrusted it to Kurusu without notifying Nomura.

Kurusu, who accepted Togo's request, met with Prime Minister Tojo at 7:00 pm on the 4th. Tojo says the United States is not ready for bilateral operations

"The United States is also flooded because of the lack of important military supplies such as rubber and tin, as the US public opinion has not yet supported the participation in the war.

I don't want a war," he said. The prospect of concluding the negotiations is about three minutes of success and seven minutes of failure, so make every effort to conclude the negotiations.

I emphasized that I wanted it.

When Kurusu concludes the negotiations, he says, "Even if the prime minister inevitably eliminates the strong opposition from all sides of the country, we will get tired of it.

When asked, "Do you support and carry out the conclusion that you have made?", Tojo declared that he would definitely carry it out with a strong tone (Kurusu said on the next 5th.

Departed from Tokyo and arrived in Washington on November 15th.

Internal report of Plan A and Plan B

Foreign Minister Togo told Ambassador Nomura on October 21 that "even in the new cabinet ... the enthusiasm for Japan-US diplomatic coordination is different from that of the former cabinet.

"There is no place to go," he said, but he issued a detailed training on November 4, the day before the Gozen Kaigi.

Togo decided on a US-Japan negotiation plan (Proposal A, Proposal B) to coordinate the "bankruptcy between Japan and the United States," and said, "This negotiation is the best.

In a later attempt, I told Nomura that my counter-proposal was the final plan in both name and reality.

In the training, the plan A is "Necessary plan C. Two issues out of three issues.

At the end, there was a problem of stationing troops and withdrawing troops.

"Withdrawal of troops, exception to the number of troops stationed in the country"

We're Toshiteha, and it's impossible to make concessions. "

In addition, the second plan is "Young rice side, the second plan, the second work, the disapproval of the situation, the imminent situation, the prolongation of the situation

What kind of alternative plan is rapidly established? It is necessary to prevent it from happening.

Explained (However, the proposal sent to Nomura is from the Southern French Indochina in the remarks to avoid interception and decipherment by the United States.

It was part of the withdrawal of troops or was intentionally dropped.

On November 5, Ridongxiang advised the start of negotiations on the proposal A, and stated that the presentation of the proposal B was "always requested in advance." further

The deadline was set as "this negotiation must be completed by the 25th of this month at the latest due to various reasons" (this November.

The 25-day deadline is considered to be unique to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

"Magic" information and receipt as an American "ultimatum"

On the American side, Togo's series of training and Japan's proposal was "the final plan in both name and reality," and "it broke down when it did not reach a conclusion."

As a result of deciphering with "magic" that "there is no other way than" and that a time limit was added, this was regarded as the ultimatum.

In other words, he had predicted in advance that Japan would go to war by "magic."

"Finally, the deadline for negotiations has appeared in the interception telegram.

The implications of this were clear to us. Japan has already begun to turn the wheels of war,

If we do not meet Japan's request by November 25, we will not quit the war with the United States.

Proposal of Proposal and Prolongation of Negotiations On November 7, Ambassador Nomura presented Proposal A to Secretary of State Hull.

Hull knew from Magic that not only the contents of the first plan but also the second plan was at the end, so most of the questions were asked.

I didn't give it a title.

After that, instead of answering the proposal, Hull confirmed with the Tojo Cabinet about the contents proposed by the Japanese side in the negotiations so far.

On the 15th, he proposed a joint US-Japan declaration on oral and economic policy on the principle of indiscriminate trade.

However, these were gestures of American sincerity, or time-earnings.

In fact, the Japanese side repeatedly sought an answer to the proposal, but the American side repeated the abstract theory and researched.

I continued to avoid certain answers such as answering above.

At the meeting on the 15th, Hull said that the issue of indiscriminate trade treatment in China would be "applied to the whole world".

He demanded the abolition of the writings, and repeatedly demanded the "death culture" of the Triple Alliance.

The Japanese side asked if it was impossible to conclude between Japan and the United States without withdrawing from the Tripartite Pact, but Hull avoided a definite answer.

It was. In addition, Hull ran away from the question of whether this discussion could be regarded as the answer to the proposal.

Nomura, keenly aware that negotiations were difficult, decided that the United States would choose war over concessions to Japan.

It is suggested that it is better to take a long-term stance without setting a deadline for negotiations (Nomura Den on 14th).

However, Foreign Minister Togo replied that the deadline for negotiations could never be changed (although Togo did not agree with the deadline negotiations).

Ambassador Kurusu participates in negotiations

Meanwhile, Ambassador Kurusu, who arrived on the 15th, met with President Roosevelt with Ambassador Nomura on the 17th (Hull was also present).

Roosevelt "there is no word among friends" in response to Kurusu, who appeals for an early conclusion of the negotiations.

Peace between Japan and China, citing the word last word between friends.)

Regarding the issue, "The United States does not intervene or mediate.

I don't know if it's in diplomatic terms, but I'd like to call it introduce. The content of the story just by bringing both sides together

You don't have to go into. "

Regarding the obligation to participate in the Tripartite Pact, Kurusu said, "It is never Germany's statement to decide from Japan's own standpoint.

It's not about threatening the back of the United States.

If the agreement between Japan and the United States is reached, the Triple Alliance will naturally be out shine. "

At this meeting, Kurusu had hopes ahead of the negotiations, but according to Hull's records, the president filed a complaint between the two ambassadors.

It was lightly pardoned, and it is stated that there was no result of the meeting.

Nomura's private plan

On November 18, it is difficult for Nomura to solve the fundamental problem in a limited time due to the poor negotiations on the proposal, the situation is

He preached that he was extremely tense, and at his own discretion, "Japan will withdraw troops from the southern part of French Indochina, while the United States will remove the freeze order.

I decided to go further. "

This is a private proposal that narrowed down the proposal that was supposed to be presented after waiting for Togo's directive, and Ambassador Kurusu said, "As a destination

It's a thoughtful proposal, but I've always agreed with it, and the local atmosphere and the position and

feelings of Ambassador Nomura.
Rather, it should be taken for granted. ”

Hull did not accept it, but he promised to consider it on the condition that Japan clarified its peace policy.

On the night of November 18, Nomura and Kurusu visited Postmaster General Walker. Walker is the president and the majority of ministers are Ryo Japan and the United States
If Japan agrees with the solution and shows peaceful intentions through actual actions such as the withdrawal of French Indochina, there will be an oil supply from the United States.
Said that.

Bishop Walsh visited the embassy on the 19th, and Japan expressed his intention to withdraw French Indochina today.
For example, Hull immediately promised to export oil, and was informed that he would like to solve the problem rapidly.

In addition, Haru’s response to the meeting with Nomura and Kurusu on that day was also favorable.

However, with the public train departing on November 20, Foreign Minister Togo said that there is room for the United States to bring up more complicated conditions.
Stated that the domestic situation in the country requires a solution similar to that of the second plan.
Presenting a plan
He rebuked Nomura for presenting his private proposal as “Notounfu Gai Hanashi” and instructed him to present Japan’s final proposal, B.].

Even in the current research, Nomura’s presentation of his proposal was “apparently an act of over-rights” and “to maximize Japan’s concessions.”
As a result, Togo’s efforts to try to do so were attributed to blisters. ”

Presentation of B plan

Foreign Minister Togo had repeatedly instructed the revision of the proposal from the strike of the proposal on November 4th to the training of the start of negotiations on the proposal on the 20th.

Meanwhile, the withdrawal of troops from the French Indochina in Remark 1 is in Section 5, and the trade indiscriminate treatment and Tripartite Pact in Remark D are in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
In the end, the item of Southern French Indochina withdrawal was added to the item 5, and the items 6 and 7 were deleted.

At the start of the negotiations, Togo said that withdrawal from Southern French Indochina was an extremely important concession, withdrawal from China and trade.
Indiscriminate treatment and the three issues of the Tripartite Pact have been shelved to ease the tense atmosphere on the American side.
I instructed Nomura to emphasize.

On November 20th (US time), Nomura and Kurusu presented Hull with a proposal (in the actual proposal presented to the US side, Nomura
At Kurusu’s discretion, paragraph 5 has been moved to paragraph 2 and the order of the clauses has been changed).

Plan B

1 Japan and the United States will not advance into Southeast Asia and South Pacific regions other than French Indochina

2 Japan withdrew from French Indochina after establishing a fair peace in the Heisei era or the Pacific region. After the conclusion of this agreement, Japan will be a southern Buddha
Northern Buddha

Declare that you are ready to move to the mark

3 Japan and the United States cooperate with each other to obtain necessary resources in the Dutch East Indies

4 Japan and the United States will restore trade relations before the asset freeze. Rice promises to supply the required oil to Japan

5 The United States refrains from taking actions that hinder the peace efforts of both Japan and China. It showed a strong discoloration in item 5).

Hull says the United States is helping Britain against Germany's conquest policy, if Japan's policy is definitely a peace policy
As long as there is no choice, he said that the support policy and the support policy are the same, and that it is "difficult to change the support policy."

At the end of the meeting, Hull said with a painful look that he would "sympathetically consider" the proposal.

Hull is more worried about the fact that it was the "ultimatum" for the United States than the content of the proposal, and with Japan.
Unless he signed some kind of tentative agreement, he was forced to make the final choice that the war might start.

On the other hand, after the decision of the second plan, the General Staff Headquarters was afraid that negotiations would be concluded, but ("Kurusu's" in "Confidential War Diary"
"Some people pray for the plane crash" (November 10)), "I'm afraid that the proposal will be approved" (13th), "Negotiations broke down due to a request to stop supporting
There is a description such as "I can no longer doubt what I should do" (20th)), and when Hull's disapproval was reported, "I decided to negotiate.
It should be torn and sprout often "(21st).

The suspension of support became a bottleneck in the negotiations on the second plan, but Togo opened the Japan-Negotiation Peace negotiations as a bridge between the United States.
We are seeking understanding with a reasoning that postpones the problem that the support policy will be unnecessary if it is started (November 24,
At a meeting with US Ambassador to Japan Glu).

The deadline for negotiations until the 25th was extended to the 29th due to a train from Foreign Minister Togo on the 22nd. For this training

"The right date is absolutely impossible to change any more, and the situation after that will progress automatically," but it goes without saying.
The American side had already been deciphered by "magic".

Answer to Japan in the United States

On the U.S. side as well, Japan's A, the provisional agreement is the military seeking time to cover the delay in the defense of the Philippines.
It was in response to the request of.

The draft basic agreement is positioned as a permanent agreement to be added to the draft provisional agreement.

The Department of State prepared a draft basic agreement and a draft provisional agreement on November 22, but the draft provisional agreement was eventually abandoned.
Therefore, only the draft basic agreement will be presented to Japan as Hull Note.

The US response to Japan consists of two parts, a provisional agreement and a basic agreement, and only the provisional agreement is passed.
There was no argument.

Basic Agreement Draft Morgenthau Private Draft

On November 11, the Department of State's Far East drafted an agreement with Japan and submitted it to Secretary of State Hull, but this was lacking in concreteness.
Met.

Meanwhile, on November 17, Treasury Secretary Hans Morgenthau submitted a draft agreement with Japan directly to the President as a private draft over the head of the State Department. (This private proposal was created by Soviet spy Harry White, a special aide to the Treasury.

Morgenthau's private plan was more specific in military and economic issues than the Far East tentative plan, so this is not the subject of consideration. It was.

Hull was uncomfortable with Morgenthau, but recalled that his proposal had some good points and was incorporated into the State Department's proposal.

Morgenthau's personal proposal is "Approach to the task of removing tension with Japan and surely defeating Germany"
The third part, the contents were as follows.

What the U.S. government proposes

Withdrawal of most of the U.S. Navy from the Pacific Ocean
Concluded a 20-year non-aggression treaty with Japan
Promote the final solution of the Manchurian problem

Defending the interests of Indochina under the government of a joint committee of the United Kingdom, France, Japan, China and the United States

Waiver of all extraterritoriality in China
Requested Congress to abolish the Immigration Act of Japan

Make most favored nation treatment and mutually satisfying import concessions to Japan
Providing a total of \$ 2 billion in loans at an annual interest rate of 2% for 20 years

A total of 500 million dollars will be contributed equally in Japan and the United States to stabilize the exchange rate between the dollar and the yen.
Lifting the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States

The United States should exert its full influence to eliminate the potential source of friction between Japan and its neighbors
What the Japanese government proposes

Withdrawal of all army, navy, air force and police forces from China (at the border of 1931), Indochina and Thailand
Stop supporting any government in China other than the National Government

Japanese currency, yen, and puppet banknotes in circulation in China at the rates agreed by the Ministry of Finance of China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Exchange for

Waiver of all extraterritoriality in China

Providing a loan of 1 billion yen at an annual interest rate of 2% for the reconstruction of China

A small number of police forces needed, provided that the Soviet Union removes the appropriate remnants from the Far East front and withdraws its troops.
Withdraw Japanese troops from Manchuria except for divisions

Sell up to three-quarters of current war material production to the United States. Price is based on cost + 20%
Evacuate all German engineers, military personnel and proponents

Most favored nation treatment for the United States and China throughout the Japanese empire

Negotiate a 10-year non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the United Kingdom, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines

In Part 4, the advantage of this agreement is that for the United States, the Pacific Fleet will be directed to other regions against Germany.
It was mentioned that the status of the Allies could be dramatically strengthened and that the war against Japan could be avoided. Also in Japan
The advantage is that you can secure peace without facing a serious war and a final defeat, rebuilding Japan and Manchuria.
It was mentioned that the power and capital could be allocated to construction.

Establishment of Hull Note

However, as a result of repeated examinations and revisions in the Far East of the State Department, an item that allows the Japanese army to station in Manchuria (of a minority division),
A \$ 2 billion loan to Japan to petition Congress to reduce US Navy power in the Pacific Ocean and abolish the 1924 Immigration Act of 1924
Comprehensive items such as have been removed.

What was inherited from the Morgenthau draft to the basic agreement draft (Hull Note) was the total withdrawal from China and French Indochina.
It was an uncompromising item.]

Regarding the Tripartite Pact, in the draft basic agreement on November 22, "The provisions of the Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany and Italy are set by Japan in the Pacific Ocean.
I agree that it should be interpreted as inapplicable to conflicts related to peacekeeping in the region. "
Was added.

Although it was an abstract expression in the final draft, it was "a clear statement of the de facto withdrawal from the Triple Alliance."
It was.

In addition, in the draft basic agreement on November 22, the item of total withdrawal of Japanese troops clearly states "China (excluding Manchuria)".
Morgenthau's draft paragraph 3 "indicates the Japanese and Chinese governments to enter into peaceful negotiations on the future position of Manchuria.
It was adopted as the expression "to incite".

However, in the final draft, the item suggesting peaceful negotiations on the Manchuria issue was deleted, and "(excluding Manchuria)" was added.
The wording was also deleted

Tentative Agreement Draft November 22nd Tentative Agreement Draft

On November 22, Hull, British Ambassador Halifax, Australian Minister Kasei, Dutch Minister Rawdon, Chinese
He invited the Ambassador of the Republic of China, Hu Shih, to explain the draft tentative agreement.

Japan and the United States have no territorial ambition in the Pacific Ocean

Japan will immediately withdraw troops from Southern French Indochina and limit the troops of Northern French Indochina to those as of July 26, 1941. That force is
25,000 or less

The United States will abolish the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States. Japan abolishes freezing of US assets in Japan Dutch and British governments
To persuade them to take similar measures

The United States does not take an unfriendly attitude toward negotiations between the parties for the purpose of resolving Japan-neutralization. This agreement is extraordinary.
It is not valid for more than 3 months.

In this provisional agreement, there is an item that the Japanese army's troops in the northern French Indochina are limited to 25,000, and although it is temporary, Japan
It allowed the military to stay in French Indochina, but the others specifically adhered to the four principles of Hull.

Hu Shih is a little less calm, but "Is this binding Japan so that it will not invade China anymore for the next three months?"

Hull asked, but Hull replied, "No."

Hull said that the negotiations are likely to be concluded, but after the talks, he told the British, Australian, and Chinese ministers again.

He requested that Japan be given the authority to determine the upper limit of supplies that could be supplied from its home country.

This is the final phase of the negotiations, and if each country inquires of the amount of supplies that can be supplied to Japan to the home country, it will be negotiated.

This is because there was a risk that it would become uncoordinated.

November 24th Provisional Agreement

On November 24, the Department of State drafted a further amended provisional and basic agreement. Especially in the draft provisional agreement on November 24

He mentioned in detail about trade issues and said that the expiration date of the agreement could be extended if a peaceful solution was in sight.

Added.

Hull again consulted with the British, Australian, and Chinese ambassadors and ministers, but Chinese ambassador Hu Shih opposed the Japanese presence in the northern French Indochina.

It was.

Hull argued that "25,000 troops are not a threat," and said, "It is for our Army and Navy that this extraordinary agreement is needed.

Time is an important issue, and more preparation is needed." Hu Shih should be reduced to 5,000

He insisted, but Hull was cold-hearted that even 50,000 troops was not a threat.

At the stage of this meeting, only the Dutch government gave instructions on the draft agreement on the 22nd, which made Hull angry.

It was.

Hull says that it is the countries concerned, not the United States, that are more interested in this issue, and what is the current situation for governments?

If you do not know what it's going to be

Dissatisfied, "These unexpected developments, lack of interest and lack of willingness to cooperate are decisive.

I was disappointed," he wrote.

On this day, Hull sent a telegram to British Prime Minister Churchill informing him of the proposal and the provisional agreement.

The telegram states that while the draft provisional agreement is a fair proposal to Japan, it is unlikely that Japan will accept it.

A postscript by President Roosevelt was attached.

Opposition of the Republic of China

Chiang Kai-shek described his feelings when he learned of the draft agreement as "anxiety and anger mixed violently in his heart." "Our country is this.

Can we survive the crisis of desperation?"

And Washington's Ambassador Hu Shih said, "Don't let America compromise with Japan.

That means the death of China."

Chiang Kai-shek also asked Owen Lattimore, an adviser in Chongqing, to oppose the draft tentative agreement.

From Lattimore, lifting economic sanctions on Japan would dangerously increase Japan's military dominance for China.

Any tentative agreement would have a negative impact on China's confidence in the United States and was abandoned at this time.

It was reported that it was doubtful that emotions could be compensated for by past support and increased aid in the future.

Chiang Kai-shek also responded to Songko Wen on November 25, by Secretary of the Army Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.

If there was any relaxation of sanctions against Japan, all the Chinese people would think they were sacrificed.

The most tragic era in the world was opened, the Chinese Army collapsed, Japan's plans were carried out, and one person

He sent a telegram saying that it was not just a loss for China.

Hull resented China's opposition, saying, "Chiang Kai-shek is a few Japanese ministers and a government agency other than the State Department.

Sending numerous telegram messages to a large number of staff members, sometimes even ignoring the president, questioning

Despite not being in touch with the truth of the subject, he sometimes intervened in subtle and serious problems. "(Khalifa)

(To the British Ambassador).

It has been pointed out that the provisional agreement was not presented to Japan because of the fierce opposition from China, but Hull said.

It did not attach much importance to China's protests.

Also, according to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, President Roosevelt responded to China's opposition by saying, "I silence them.

I'll do it," he said to Hull.

November 25, Final draft of provisional agreement

On November 25th, the final draft of the provisional agreement, which was a compilation of the 22nd and 24th drafts, was completed. There is an objection within the government

Every time it came out, the content of the harmony was drained, and especially regarding the oil supply that Japan had longed for, "for private use

Limited to "oil" only.

Hull said, "The provisional agreement gives Japan a very limited amount of flowers, oil and some supplies. It was just a small amount of "chicken food". "

In addition, because he was concerned that the final plan would be misunderstood that the United States allowed the Japanese troops to be stationed in French Indochina, he decided to use Northern French Indochina.

The specific number of remaining Japanese troops (25,000) has been deleted, and the wording of troops on July 26, 1941.

Only left.

Britain agreed with the draft tentative agreement, saying, "If Hull is the best way, you can support it."

I questioned the resumption of oil exports to Japan), the Netherlands is a stone that does not increase Japan's military potential

I agreed with the condition of oil supply.

In addition, Australian Minister Kasei told his home country, "Even if it is difficult to accept the proposal itself, if you make corrections, all the countries concerned

It could be acceptable to us," he said, and was instructed by his home country to prevent the rupture of the summit.

Stimson's Diary (Tuesday, November 25, 1941)

Secretary of the Army Stimson wrote in his diary the following events, calling November 25 "a really busy day":
ing.

The first is that he and Hull had a meeting with Secretary of the Navy Knox, and the final draft of the provisional agreement is as follows.
It is in (25th morning).

"Hull presented a three-month truce.

He intended to make a proposal to the Japanese side today or tomorrow.

I quickly learned that it was a good deal of the interests of the United States, but the content of the proposal was
It was so fierce that I thought Japan had little opportunity to accept it. "

The second is the content of the meeting at the White House, which is a discussion about relations with Japan (noon on the 25th).
The United States will probably be around next Monday (December 1st), as the Japanese are notorious for ambushing without warning.
It could be attacked by ", and the question was how to deal with this.

The immediate problem is how the first attack on the Japanese side, without us being exposed to too much danger.
The question was whether to put them in a position to cut the fire.

This was a difficult proposition. "

And the third is a report from the US Army Intelligence Service delivered to Stimson.

"When I returned to the Ministry of the Army, I heard news from the Army Intelligence Service that Japan had already begun an expedition.

Five divisions came to Shanghai from Shandong and Shanxi, where they boarded thirty, forty, or fifty ships, and this
Was recognized in the south of Taiwan.

Immediately after calling Hull to the phone and telling him about it, I made a "copy" of the report from the Army Intelligence Service with Hull.
"Sent to the rule" However, the actual report says "a fleet of ten to thirty ships" and the troops "mean 50,000".
There is a possibility, but there is a greater possibility of a smaller number, "said the Ministry of Information, based on an agreement between the Japanese government and the Vichy government.
It was judged to be "normal behavior".

This information does not convey the special movement of the Japanese army, but the description in Stimson's diary is large in number.
So, it remains a question whether Stimson accurately conveyed the content to Roosevelt and Hull.

Abandonment of draft tentative agreement

On the afternoon of November 25, Hull was attending a State Department meeting, but was present at Herbert Feis.
According to Q), Hull was called many times during the meeting by an outside call, and I don't know who the caller was.
But after the call, Hull should be reluctant to draft the modus vivendi
(Face may have been the president and the recent sentiment of Japanese military action.
It may have been a reporter. ")
However, at this meeting, Hull did not declare abandonment of the draft modus vivendi.

However, early in the morning of the 26th, Hull called Stimson and said, "I broke all that proposal (provisional agreement).
I made up my mind and decided to announce that I had nothing else to propose. "
Hull responded to a question from the Dutch minister and explained that it was early morning on November 26 that he decided to abandon the draft modus vivendi.
It matches what you did).

Immediately after this call, Stimson called Roosevelt and received a copy of yesterday's Army Intelligence Service report.
I asked if it was, and told the news of the Japanese army southward.

According to Stimson's diary, the copy did not reach Roosevelt, saying, "The president is completely excited and on fire.
I was angry.

The Japanese side is negotiating a general truce, including a total truce from China, while on the other hand, an expedition to Indochina.
The situation has changed completely because the attempt to send troops is the best proof that Japan cannot be trusted at all.
I said that."

It seems that Stimson may have overstated the movement of the Japanese army as in the diary.
ing.

Roosevelt also knew that materials and troops had been transported to the Japanese army in the south for some time.
Why was he "angry like a fiery fire" at the "normal behavior" based on this agreement between Japan and the Vichy government?
I don't know.

Meanwhile, on the morning of the 26th, Hull removed the provisional agreement from the US response to Japan against Roosevelt, and based on it.
He requested that only the draft agreement be handed over to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, and obtained approval.

"In view of the opposition of the Chinese government and the cold support or de facto opposition of the British, Dutch and Australian governments, and the opposition is widely known.
Due to the fact that it has become, and the total lack of understanding of the widespread importance and value of the interim agreement in particular.
Of course, in view of the opposite, the possibility of further spread

In any case, the right measures are wise and advantageous for all countries that oppose the invading countries interested in the Pacific region.
I will not abandon my view, but at this time I invited the Japanese ambassador to hand over a comprehensive basic proposal for general peace resolution.
At the same time, it is a strong advocacy of withdrawing the modus vivendi, "but China's opposition was true.
, The response of other countries is not true, and the content of "the opposite, the possibility of further expansion" is unknown.

Hull's testimony at the US House of Representatives Joint Investigation Commission on the post-war attack on Pearl Harbor also stated that the president
"I can't remember what kind of conversation I had," he said, and it is not clear how the draft agreement was abandoned.

According to Hull's memoirs, there is a danger that China's opposition and proceeding with a provisional agreement with Japan will disrupt China's fighting spirit.
In consideration of gender, the description seems to have abandoned the draft provisional agreement.

November 26, Hull Note presented at the Japan-US talks

Hull note

Paragraph 1 "Mutual Declaration on Policy"

No national territorial integrity and sovereignty non-invasion principle
Other countries' domestic problems D vs. Sul non-involvement principle
Trade opportunities and treatment equality before the law

Conflict prevention and peaceful resolution as well as peaceful methods and procedures for improving the international situation
International cooperation and international mediation

principle

(Omitted)

Section 2 "Measures to be Taken by the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan"

Proposal of a multilateral non-aggression pact between the United Kingdom, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States

Respect for territorial sovereignty of French Indochina, ensuring equal treatment in trade and trade with French Indochina Japan

Total withdrawal from China (China) and French Indochina.

Japan and the United States do not recognize any government other than the Chiang Kai-shek government (Kuomintang Chongqing government) supported by the United States (Japan supports it) Denial of the Wang Jingwei administration that supported it)

Extraterritoriality on the 1901 Beijing Protocol, including foreign concessions and related interests in the United Kingdom or countries of mainland China

Efforts of the two countries to obtain agreement on abandonment Exchange for re-conclusion of trade treaty based on most favored nation treatment

Start of Wataru

Unfreeze of Japanese assets by the United States, unfreeze of American assets by Japan

Concluded an agreement on yen-dollar exchange rate stability and established a currency fund

No agreement between Japan and the United States with a third country is interpreted as contrary to peacekeeping in the Pacific region (

Substantial abolition of the Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany and Italy)

Promotion of the contents of this agreement by both countries

In the attached oral statement, Hull Note states, "A simple solution that spans the entire Pacific region." Adjusting the gap between the US proposal on June 21st and the Japanese proposal on September 25th ", but in reality, the Japanese side All requests were ignored.

In the US draft dated June 21, words that show understanding to Japan's position as a condition for Japan's neutralization (defense against the communist movement)

There was also an item (such as "Friendly Negotiations on Manchuria"), which targets the Japanese troops stationed in China for future consideration.

However, Hull Note has raised the conditions.

Japanese Ambassador's counterargument

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, who received the Hull Note, showed disapproval and exchanged with Secretary of State Hull, but Hull said, "Both

I do not explain or insist on entering.

The overall attitude was almost useless, and there was no island to attach to. "

Kurusu commented on the conclusion of the multilateral non-aggression pact (paragraph 2, paragraph 1), "(in Japan) has a bitter experience since the Washington Conference.

Despite this, reviving a mechanism similar to the Nine-Power Treaty completely ignores the Sino-Japanese War over the past four years.

Hull did not add any powerful rebuttal.

Regarding disapproval of troops other than the Chongqing government in paragraph 2 and 3 and the Chongqing government in paragraph 2-4

Just as Japan cannot kill the Nanjing government, Hull said, "The Nanjing government cannot be killed." "I have no ability to govern China at all," he said. "I do not insist on immediate withdrawal."

The Japanese side said, "When it comes to the issue of the Tripartite Pact, the United States hopes that Japan will make as many concessions as it can.

On the other hand, it's almost like calling me to apologize to Chongqing for the China issue. " Protested that President Belt did not think that it was this purpose that he wanted to "introduce" Nikkeihei.
Then Hull silently did not answer.

When Kurusu asked about the tentative agreement, Hull had already explored the possibility of the problem, and he should do his best to explore it.
I just answered that I was exhausted.

At the end of the meeting, Kurusu even said that there was deep suspicion that this note would be passed on to the government as it is, Nomura said in the United States.
He requested Hull to meet with the president, as there was no room for consideration outside of this proposal.

Next day Japan-US talks

President Roosevelt, who met with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu on November 27 (US time), has a clear attitude but reconsiders the plan.
There seemed to be no room at all.

Roosevelt said, "I still have great hope and hope for peace," but Nomura's "this time on your side."
In response to the statement that the proposal should disappoint Japan, "I am really disappointed that things have come to this point."
I have. "

In addition, "I was exposed to the first cold water by the Japanese invasion of French Indochina, and this time the second cold water (Japan's advance to Thailand).
There are also concerns about (rumors of being stationed). "

"During the meeting between Hull and your ambassador, it was very difficult to negotiate because I didn't hear any peaceful words from the Japanese leaders.
"The provisional agreement will eventually invalidate the temporary solution unless the fundamental principles of Japan and the United States are in agreement."
It was solid.

Hull, who was present, also explained the reason why the provisional agreement was unsuccessful.
However, the United States is required to supply oil, but that is a place that US public opinion cannot accept.
It is regrettable that the leader of the group insisted on the construction of a new order by force ...

"We are convinced that Japan. The greatest benefit is that it follows Hitlerism and the course of its attacks.
Will not come out, and Japan's best interests are in the path we outlined at this meeting.
That is.

However, if Japan unfortunately decides to take the former, there is no doubt that Japan will end up in the end.
I'm sure I'll be the loser. "

Hull declares the end of diplomatic negotiations

Regarding the abandonment of the draft agreement and the presentation of Hull Note, the November 27, Stimson Diary states:

"First and foremost this morning, I called Hull over the phone and what was the end of the negotiations with Japan?
Did we hand over to Japan that new proposal, which we commented on a few days ago, or Hull yesterday?
As I said, I asked these points whether I gave up everything.

Hull replied, "I then withdrew. Now it's in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.
I have it in my hands. " That ah

I called the president over the phone. The president gave me a slightly different opinion.

The president says Japan has discontinued, but Japan has discontinued with a fine statement prepared by Hull.
It was.

I later learned that this was not a resumption of the matter, but a statement of the unchanging principle of the United States. ”
President Zubet agrees with Secretary of the Army Stimson’s proposal to issue a “last warning order” to local commanders
I meant.

First, he told Army commanders in the Philippines, Hawaii, etc. “Negotiations with Japan leave only the possibility that Japan will propose to continue the talks again.
And finished all the practical purposes.

Japan’s future actions are unpredictable, but we do not know when hostile actions will occur. ”
For the Pacific Fleet and the Asian Fleet

On the other hand, “war warning” that “Japan–US negotiations have already ended and Japan’s aggressive actions are expected within the next few days.”
Was issued.

Furthermore, at the military conference on the 28th, there was a discussion about the southward advance of the Japanese army, especially if the Japanese army advanced to the Isthmus of Kra.
The squirrels agreed that they would fight, and if Britain fought, the United States would have to.

On the 29th, Hull told the British Ambassador to the United States Halifax:

“The US–Japan diplomatic sector is over.

Now the problem is in the hands of the Army and Navy.

In my opinion, Japan’s completely renewed conquest plan is probably a bet of slack or slack, so it’s extreme.
Must be bold and adventurous.

They will go crazy and desperately, without paying much attention to the outcome of the German–Soviet war. ”

Reactions of related countries

The abandonment of the draft agreement surprised countries other than China, and on the 27th, the British ambassador to the United States Halifax announced that it was in Wales.
Protested to the Under Secretary of State ...

However, Halifax was convinced when Wells gave information that a large Japanese army was moving south.

Also, on the 29th, the Australian Minister to the United States Kasei offered mediation between Japan and the United States, but Hull has passed the diplomatic stage.
I refuse.]

Japanese reaction

Hull Note incoming call and November 27 liaison meeting

Ambassador Nomura’s first report (summary report of Hull Note) and summary report telegram from military attachés in the United States arrived in Japan one after another.
It is said that it will be on the afternoon of the 27th.

Summarizing the recollections of Prime Minister Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo, we received reports from Nomura and military attachés in the United States, and this was held at a liaison meeting at 2:00 pm.
It is said that it was deliberated.

Tojo concludes the deliberation: “The memorandum on November 26 is clearly the ultimatum to Japan.”

"This memorandum is with Japan.
It cannot be accepted.

Moreover, the United States has notified that the right clause is unacceptable to Japan. "
Although I am determined to war between Japan and Japan
"It's like that," said Togo, who was surprised at the hard-line attitude of the United States.

Some of the main warriors in the army seemed to be relieved, but in general they seemed disappointed. "
I'm recollecting.

The context of the Hull Note call is unclear, but according to Sugiyama Memo, at the liaison meeting on the 27th, "Declaration of war"
"Order of administrative procedures" and "Guidelines for national theory accompanying the execution of war" were adopted, and the nation that started the war at the Gozen Kaigi on December 1st.
Make a decision, the day after the start of the war, by "Declaration of War"

It was stipulated to declare war.

(In the "Confidential War Diary", "Conducting a liaison conference, controlling a large number of unsuccessful negotiations with the United States, and various procedures leading up to the start of the war in the future.
It will be deliberated and decided on the occasion "(27th).

In addition, Emperor Showa received a speech from Prime Minister Tojo at 1:27 pm on the 27th about the Japan-US negotiations, and the following day, 28th, 11 am
At 30:30, Foreign Minister Togo explained Hull Note.

In the column of "Kido Koichiki" on November 28, "I will explain the counter-proposal of the US Foreign Minister Togo.
It has been.

Receiving as Tenyu

Regarding the draft agreement, information on leaks from China overseas has been circulated and transmitted to the Japanese side, saying, "The United States is an economy.
It is judged that Japan should stop using force because the relationship will be restored. "(Sato, Chief of Military Affairs Division),
"As a request from the US side, it seems that our French Indochina unit will be completely withdrawn and the asset freeze will be lifted," said Foreign Minister Togo.
There was a view.

However, Hull's answer was not something like a compromise with Japan, but "unexpectedly strong content" (Sato).

The "Confidential War Diary" describes the telegram from military attachés in the United States as follows.

"In the end, I received a call from a U.S. military attaché and responded with a U.S. document.

Total withdrawal from China and French Indochina

Denial of the National Government (Wang Jingwei Administration)
Triple Alliance Sky Culture

Rice's answer It's totally overwhelming. The intention is extremely clear, and it is a reconfirmation of the Nine-Power Treaty. Any changes to the policy toward the Far East
No sincerity to join.

Of course, the negotiations broke down. At this point, the empire's determination to open the war became easier, and the degree of sprouting was high.

It should also be called Tenyu. It should make the people's belly firmer and the national theory should be easier. "Represented by the operation staff.

For the main warriors, Hull will help to finally consolidate the decision to open the war and contribute to the consensus of national opinion.
The note was "Tenyu".

In fact, Foreign Minister Togo and Finance Minister Kaya did not oppose the start of the war, and the Navy decided to open the war unanimously.
It was. In that sense, it can be said that Hull Note had a shock comparable to the attack on Pearl Harbor for Japan.

Disappointment of Foreign Minister Togo

"I worked hard until the arrival of Hull Note'. I fought again. The 'Note' made me lack my strength. Rather than apologize, my feelings of resentment for not being recognized in good faith were stronger.

After that, I lost the heat to work. "Foreign Minister Togo refused the proposal B, which was presented as the final proposal by the Japanese side, and Hull Note's
Disappointed with the content, he abandoned the diplomatic solution.

Togo said, "I was shot by a dizzying disappointment." .. "Ignoring Japan's long-standing sacrifice, the Great in the Far East
I told you to abandon your national status.

However, this is equivalent to Japan's suicide. "" This Kumon means more than forcing Japan to give in or war.
Righteousness, that is, a letter of challenge to Japan

It seems that it is safe to see that he has struck. At least the ultimatum with no time limit is right
That's right. "

At that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was deciphering the codes of China and the United States, and Togo is considering a provisional agreement on the American side.
It has been pointed out that he may have known that ... Togo's disappointment can be thought of as a combination of such disappointments.

Naotake Sato, an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was consulted by Togo, said, "Even if something like Hull Note came, it would be extinct.
Thinking that I had to find a way to get out of the crisis without wishing, I felt suffocated with Shigenori three times before and after.
We had a discussion. "

Togo, who turned to the theory of war, said, "The negotiations between Japan and the United States have not been established, the war is inevitable and there is no need to avoid it again, and the long-term war is defeated.

In response to the attitude that "is unexpected," Sato said, "If the war is likely to overthrow national luck, avoid it until you get tired of it."
It is unavoidable and unavoidable, "but Sato resigned from his position as an advisor after a farewell.

At a cabinet meeting on the 28th, Togo said, "There is a difference from our conventional claim, and since April, we have been in contact with each other for more than half a year.
Please come up with an unmanned proposal that can completely ignore the circumstances of the affairs, "accused Hull Note.

In addition, to Ambassador Nomura, "We should be able to use the right (Hull Note) as the basis of negotiations. Therefore, this time
Negotiations will be virtually terminated by the imperial government's request for the right US proposal, but to the other party
It is important to avoid giving the impression that the negotiations have broken down. "
It became a gesture to do>

December 1st Gozen Kaigi

In Japan, many officials have received Hull Note as a de facto ultimatum or declaration of war.

At the Gozen Kaigi meeting on December 1, Prime Minister Tojo made efforts to negotiate between Japan

and the United States, but "The United States has given up one step on its conventional claims. Not only that, but also under the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, unconditional total withdrawal from China, denial of the Nanjing government, Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany and Italy. We have added new conditions, such as demanding a death culture, and forced a one-sided concession of the empire.

If you make it an empire and do not obey it, you will have to lose the authority of the empire and expect the completion of the Sino-Japanese War, and finally
This is in line with the consequences of jeopardizing the existence of the empire. "

And the United States, Britain and the Netherlands are intensifying economic and military pressure, and especially in terms of operations, no further prolongation of time is allowed.
As a matter of fact, "The Empire has reached the end of the war against the United States, Britain and Lan in order to overcome the current danger and complete self-defense.
It's up to you. "

Foreign Minister Togo also made the following opinion to Hull Note.

"There are some items that we should accept, such as trade issues (paragraph 2, paragraph 6, 7, 8) and abolition of extraterritoriality in China (paragraph 2, paragraph 5).
Although it is absent, matters related to China-French Indochina (paragraph 2, paragraph 2, 3), denial of the national government (paragraph 2, paragraph 4,) , denial of the Tripartite Pact (paragraph 2, paragraph 9)
, And the multilateral non-aggression pact (paragraph 2, paragraph 1), etc. belong to the ones that the empire can never agree on, and this proposal is a US side obedience.
I have to admit that it is unreasonable to make a significant step backwards compared to the previous proposals and to ignore the process of negotiations over half a year old.
"I don't get it." "Although we continue negotiations on the basis of the proposal, it is almost impossible to fully carry out my claim.
I have to say none. "

As a result of the meeting, the opening of the war against the United States and Britain will be resolved. The following is the state of Emperor Showa who made the declaration of war in "Sugiyama Memo".
It is written in the sea urchin.

"Today's meeting two times, explanations on the top, nodding one by one, no worries about anything, worshipping chin, beautiful shikiyani
On the same day, Chief of Staff Sugiyama and Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff lined up to make a big deal regarding the implementation of the operation.
After seeking a courtesy, Emperor Showa said, "It is unavoidable to be like this.

Please cooperate with the Army and Navy. "

The following day, December 2, following the final decision on the start date of the war on December 8, at 5:30 pm, from the Combined Fleet Command, Hull
Order to attack Pearl Harbor to MTF, which had set sail for Pearl Harbor on Oahu, Hawaii before the note was presented.
Was issued.

About Manchuria in Hull Note Whether "China (China)" in Hull Note includes Manchuria
It often becomes a problem (the theory that Manchuria is not included in "China" in Hull Note is the American side.
From a researcher).

However, the Manchuria issue is a low priority for Secretary of State Hull, and it is not even an issue in the US-Japan negotiations.

Neither Hull nor Ambassador Nomura use the word "China" to include Manchuria, and the perception within the Far East of the State Department is similar.
And that was the common sense in the field.

Manchuria also means a different region from China in the original draft of Hull Note, Mogenthau, on

November 22nd.

Proposal • The November 24th draft also clearly stated "China (excluding Manchuria)" (however, the November 25th draft (Hull Note)).

The inset "(excluding Manchuria)" has been removed.

It is still unknown why such a fix was made during the hours between the 24th and the 25th).

On the other hand, regarding the interpretation of the Japanese government, Hull Note explained in the explanation of Prime Minister Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo at the Gozen Kaigi on December 1st.

Regarding the interpretation of, even if it mentions "denial of the Wang Jingwei administration", it does not mention the denial of Manchuria, and Togo says the United States.

If he accepts the proposal, he says, "As a result, the status of Manchuria will inevitably be upset."

It is acknowledged that it was based on the premise that Manchuria was not included in "China (China)".

Since the President of the Privy Council of the Council of Yoshimichi Hara asked about this point at the Gozen Kaigi, the exchange between Hara and Togo is drawn below.

To use.

Hara: In particular, the rice is in the word "China" at the point that the rice should raise the Chongqing administration and withdraw troops from all China.

Whether the two ambassadors have confirmed this, and how they understand it, as soon as it means including Manchuria.

Togo "At the meeting on the 26th (Nomura-Kurusu-Hull meeting at the time of presenting Hull Note), I touched on the current question.

I'm not here.

However, as soon as China included Manchuria, Manchuria was originally included in the April 16 US proposal (Japan-US Ryokan).

Since it may be said that we approve, China does not include it, but the story is reversed like this time and it is heavy.

Considering that the Kei administration has been recognized as the only administration and the Wang Jingwei administration has been crushed, do you deny the previous statement?

I don't know. "

Shinji Sudo said that it is unbelievable that Togo believes that the US-Japan solution is a US proposal.

What about this issue, saying that the valve is logically incomprehensible and does not answer the question at all

He points out the indifference that he has not discussed.

And the oath testimony at Tojo's Tokyo Tribunal (as a difficult problem for Hull Note, "Nothing from all over China (including Manchuria)"

"Conditions withdrawal", "Manchurian government denial", etc.), recollection of Operation Director Shinichi Tanaka (Hull Note "All branches (Manchuria)

Withdrawal from (including) ", "Interpreted as "denial of the Manchurian government"), recollection of Kenryo Sato, chief of the military affairs section ("Full from China including Manchuria"

Interpreted as "withdrawal") from the testimony of military personnel, "on the premise that" (Manchuria is not included in China) is not included.

I don't think it was. "

However, according to Atsushi Yasui, the testimony of military personnel on which Sudo relied had the problem of postwar recollection, and it was before the war.

Rui is inconsistent with the primary historical materials (immediately after the start of the war).

In fact, a translation of Hull Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an explanation of Togo at the Gozen Kaigi, a report from a military attaché in the United States, and Prime Minister Tojo's radio. Broadcast] etc. cannot confirm the wording "including Manchuria".

There is no doubt that there was a rumor from Hara's question that "including Manchuria" at that time, but among those who were in a responsible position, "

It is not admitted that it was interpreted as "including Manchuria."

In other words, it was after the war that Hull Note was publicly told that there was also a request from the United States to withdraw Manchuria.

Tracing its origins, the defendant's (Japanese) claim in the Tokyo Tribunal—the harsh withdrawal of troops

from China, including Manchuria.

The request leads to the "Hull Note War Opening Theory" that Japan was forced to open the war.

Newspaper coverage at the time

In the evening edition of the Asahi Shimbun dated January 28, under the headline "Secretary of State Hull Handjobs the Last Document," Secretary of State Hull was on the afternoon of the 26th.

At the Japan-US talks, I handed a document to Japan 1, but the right summarizes the US attitude toward a peaceful solution to the Japan-US problem.

It is presumed that this was done. "Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu did not speak at all to the questions of the reporters."

"With the resumption of the Japan-US talks on the 26th, all sides will probably have significant significance to the future of the Japan-US negotiations.

We are making consistent observations."

Hull handed on the 26th under the headline "Rice, do not let go of the principle claim" in the Chugai Shogyo Shimpō dated November 28th.

About the document, "probably the final U.S. proposal," said a U.S. government spokesman.

Then, the document on the right says, "It shows the fact that the talks over the past two or three weeks have reached their climax, and everyone is familiar with it.

It is based on some basic principle. However, this is because there are still proposals from the US side.

It suggests that he is stubbornly sticking to the principle claims of the past, so the prospects for the talks are very optimistic.

It seems to be unforgivable."

According to the Alliance Telegraph from New York on the 27th, "On the evening of the 26th, Secretary of State Hull met with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, and wrote a statement.

After handing over the calligraphy, pessimism became overwhelming at a steep angle, and the morning newspapers on the 27th said, "The US-Japan negotiations are finally over.

The time has come for Japan-US relations to be decided as one of the Japanese wars."

There is a lot of pessimism."

After the start of the war, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the "progress of US-Japan negotiations." Among them are the full text of the proposal and all ten Hull notes.

The outline of the article is included, and in the evening edition of the Asahi Shimbun dated December 9, it is said that "US, China withdrawal and the Triple Alliance death culture"

The full text of the "Memorandum of Understanding for the United States" was reported under the heading "The Japanese side handed the ultimatum of the termination of negotiations."

Is posted).

To the beginning of the war President Roosevelt's electrophile to Emperor Showa

Even though negotiations became desperate at Hull Note, there was still a move to prevent the start of the war.

Ambassador Kurusu uses various routes, saying that only His Majesty the Emperor and President Roosevelt can prevent the war.

I was working on the president to send an electrophile to Emperor Showa.

In addition, Hidenari Terasaki, the first secretary, also embarked on electrophile work with the approval of Kurusu.

(On the morning of November 26, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu reported that it would be difficult to pass all of the proposals, and the situation was resolved.

As a measure, he advised Foreign Minister Togo on a plan to exchange electrophiles between President Roosevelt and Emperor Showa to "renew the air."

Was.

However, since this proposal was rejected by Togo, Kurusu and Terasaki's actions would go against the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

On the other hand, the US side had a plan to hit an electrophile for a long time, but Secretary of State Hull told Roosevelt that "Japan's attack

I'd like to postpone it until it's almost started."

On December 6, President Roosevelt sent an electrophile to Emperor Showa ... The purpose of the electrophile is that if the Japanese army is from French Indochina
The United States has no intention of invading the area even if it withdraws troops, and is ready to seek similar security from neighboring governments, South Pacific
He wanted them to withdraw from the French Indochina for peace in the region.

Hull's original plan was "90-day ceasefire between Japan and China, prohibition of movement of troops from Pacific countries, reduction of Japanese troops in France, both Japan and China.
It was like a reproduction of an already abandoned provisional agreement such as "Start of national peace negotiations", but Roosevelt is here.
I didn't adopt it.

Roosevelt's true intentions about sending an electrophile are not clear, but Hull says, "Sending it makes a record.
The effect is doubtful except for the purpose. "

The electrophile was detained at the Tokyo Central Telegraph Bureau for 15 hours, and finally arrived at Emperor Showa at 3:00 am on December 8th.
(At 7:30 am in Hawaii time, about 30 minutes before the scheduled attack on Pearl Harbor) (At this time, Emperor Showa said, "The Navy Army.
It was revealed for the first time by "Showa Emperor Jitsuroku" that he had been "dressed").

After the war, Emperor Showa said, "This electrophile is very clerical, and it seems to be addressed to the prime minister or foreign minister.
I think it was the happiness of unhappiness that I was able to kill. "

Regarding the electrophile, Togo said, "It is hard to admit that it can save this dangerous station," and Tojo also said, "That kind of thing is useless for anything.
Isn't it? "

According to the diplomatic document released in March 2013, the Allied Forces General Headquarters (GHQ) told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the war.
He said that the war could have been avoided if the telegram was handed over to His Majesty the Emperor without delay.
It is clear that it was.

Memorandum of Understanding to the United States—Answer to Hull Note

Local Hawaii time December 7, 1941 7:50 am (Washington time 1:20 pm, Japan time December 8, 3:20 am
Minutes), the attack on Pearl Harbor was launched.

Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary of State Hull a memorandum of understanding (diplomatic discontinuation notice) at 2:20 pm on December 7, Washington time.
It was exchanged.

Foreign Minister Togo's directive stated, "At one time in the afternoon, the U.S. side (preferably to the Secretary of State) will be directly handed over by your ambassador."
However, as a result, it became a handjob one hour after the Hawaii air raid.

The memorandum of understanding with the United States is also the view of the imperial government on Hull Note, and it is "reality" to urge Japan to adopt the four principles of Hull.
It does not promote the conclusion of negotiations with an attitude of ignoring the above and forcing the other country to make a self-righteous claim.
The multi-sided non-aggression pact of item 1 is "as a result of pursuing the old concept of the collective peace organization, it can be separated from the actual situation of Toa."
Regarding paragraph 2, paragraph 9, "Restrict the fulfillment of the empire's Tripartite Pact obligations when the United States enters the European War.
It is not accepted because it is recognized that it can be proposed with the intention of doing so.
Paragraph 2, Paragraph 2 "leads the situation in Toa to confusion."
It is unacceptable to extend the system similar to the Nine-Power Treaty, which is one of the biggest causes, to French Indochina.
The total withdrawal of troops from China (China) and the unconditional application of the principle of

non-discrimination in trade "both ignore the reality of China and Toa
"To destroy the status of the empire, which is a stable force of the Nanjing government," and the denial
of the Nanjing government "overturns the foundation of negotiations."
Difficulty, such as demonstrating that the United States is willing to impede peace recovery in Japan and
the East.
He pointed out, "There are things that ignore the sacrifice of the Sino-Japanese War, which lasts for
more than four years, threaten the survival of the empire, and desecrate authority.

Therefore, overall, the Imperial Government regrets that it has no choice but to accept it as the basis for
negotiations. "

Regarding the US response to Japan's proposal, "The US government must accept the new proposal.
Not only that, he expressed his intention to continue the act of support (despite the fact that the
president stated that he would act as an intermediary for peace between Japan and China).
When he introduced the president's so-called Japan-Span peace, he withdrew without grace, and finally
reached November 26, and the United States was biased.
With the attitude of forcing the government to stick to the principles that it has traditionally adhered to,
it has come to make a proposal that can ignore the claims of the imperial government.
The right is the most regrettable place of the imperial government. "

In addition, the memorandum of understanding with the United States does not have the equivalent of
"taking independence action" during the Russo-Japanese War, and it is a declaration of war or a
declaration of war.
The conditional declaration of war is not specified.

In addition, the memorandum of understanding with the United States has not undergone the procedures
of cabinet decision, performance, and approval even in Japan.
It couldn't be, and it wasn't the ultimatum to the hostile country in terms of the form of domestic
measures. "

The following day, on the 8th, President Roosevelt delivered a parliamentary speech, "Shameful Day
Speech," calling for a declaration of war on Japan. In the speech
He said he was in talks about peace between Japan and the Pacific, but did not explain the existence of
Hull Note to Congress.

The opening of the war between Japan and the United States does not mean that the United States will
immediately enter the European front, and Japan will not participate in the German-Soviet war.
As mentioned above, under the provisions of the Tripartite Military Alliance, other member states are
obliged to participate in the wars initiated by the member states.
I didn't.

According to Hull's recollection, there was debate over whether the United States would declare war on
other Axis powers.
However, he thought that he would declare war from Germany, and decided to wait for it. Hitler has
already existed before the attack on Pearl Harbor
It was judged that the war against the United States was inevitable, and on December 11, a declaration of
war was declared against the United States in response to Japan.

For this reason, the United States will participate in the European Campaign.

Current research points out that there were no clear issues between Japan and the United States that had
to be resolved until the war.
It has been. Although Japan was in a difficult situation due to the economic blockade of the United States,
Britain and the Netherlands, it voluntarily judged the world situation and voluntarily.
He had the freedom to act.

Considering the results of the war, "It is said that Japan must start the war immediately due to the failure
of the US-Japan negotiations.
It was too short-circuited thinking. "

Although it is part of the Army, it was the battlefields of Japan and Germany that the de facto acceptance
of Hull Note came to be claimed.
Turned into a disadvantage.

It was in 1943 (War Guidance Division, September 16th, "Measures to End the Greater East Asia War").

The third "Peace conditions for obtaining a disadvantageous compromise due to the end of the world (against Britain and the United States)" states the four principles of Hull.

Approval, abolition of the Triple Alliance, return to the state before the Sino-Japanese War for China, Southeast Asia region south of French Indochina

Is clearly stated to return to the state before the French Indochina was stationed).